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Egalitarian-oriented Whites tend to employ the strategy of “liking everyone,” as opposed 
to correcting for their automatic prejudices, as a means of avoiding prejudiced reactions 
(Zabel & Olson, 2014). Congruent with motivational theoretical perspectives regarding 
prejudice (i.e., Aversive Racism; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), I contend that a lack of 
introspection into one’s automatic prejudices due to a self-image threat may be driving 
this tendency. In the experiment I report here, I assessed the automatic racial attitudes of 
egalitarian- (high Concern) and conflict avoidance-motivated (high Restraint) Whites. 
Then, participants were randomly assigned to introspect (or not) on their automatic racial 
biases, as well as to self-affirm (or not) using a values importance task. Following, 
participants completed an impression formation task in which they rated Black and White 
targets. Results indicated that egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals with pro-
White automatically-activated attitudes corrected for their prejudices by providing greater 
pro-Black trait ratings when self-affirmation preceded racial attitude introspection. This 
pattern of prejudice correction did not occur among high Concern individuals who 
introspected on their racial attitudes prior to being self-affirmed, or did not introspect or 
self-affirm at all. Findings are congruent with previous research attesting to the utility of 
self-affirmation in increasing attention to otherwise self-threatening information, and 
provide insights as to how the strategies employed by aversive racists and their negative 
implications may be reduced.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Racial prejudices and stereotypes are pervasive in American society and learned 
via imitations and observations of parents, teachers, and peers from an early age. 
Furthermore, they can influence behavior and judgments swiftly and automatically 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). A person does 
not have to actively endorse a prejudice or stereotype in order for it to have a direct effect 
on judgments or behavior (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Institutional rules 
and national laws, as well as the development of social norms that punish and reprimand 
obvious expressions of discrimination have shifted the nature of prejudices from more 
overt antipathy to more covert and subtle forms. Not surprisingly, given this shift, 
measures of prejudice and theoretical perspectives regarding their composition and 
expression have evolved as well.  
  Indeed, egalitarian-oriented motives and motives to avoid the social costs of 
appearing prejudiced have been found to moderate the influence of automatic prejudice 
on judgments and behaviors (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Olson & Fazio, 2004; see Fazio & 
Olson, 2014 for a review). Egalitarian-oriented individuals still possess automatic racial 
prejudices but may not wish to look inward and examine their biases, due to a threat to 
their egalitarian threat image. This is consistent with Aversive Racism Theory (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 1986), which contends egalitarian-minded, automatically prejudiced 
individuals engage in specific strategies to avoid situations, contexts, attributions, and 
processes that may reveal their automatic prejudices. Consistent with Aversive Racism 
Theory, recent research indicates that egalitarian-oriented (but automatically prejudiced) 
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individuals tend to follow a ‘like everyone’ heuristic instead of attempting to correct for 
the influence of their prejudices on judgments and behaviors (Zabel & Olson, 2014). 
Thus, ironically, the very individuals who would seemingly desire most to avoid 
prejudiced reactions may be unlikely to introspect and subsequently correct for their 
automatic racial biases due perhaps to the potential threat to their egalitarian self-image. 
The present research investigates whether a lack of introspection may be facilitating bias 
correction failure among egalitarian-oriented Whites, as well as how these individuals 
might be prompted to introspect on their prejudices and potentially correct for the effects 
of their automatic biases in their judgments and behaviors. 
Dual-Process Theories 
 Dual-process theories explain mental processes that underlie social behavior as 
stemming from an interplay between automatic and controlled processes. Automatic 
mental processes are deemed to influence behavior in a more unconscious, effortless, and 
involuntary manner, relative to more controlled processes, which influence behavior in a 
more conscious, effortful, and voluntary manner. Dual process theories have enjoyed 
abundant empirical support and extension in several social psychology realms, including 
social perception, attitudes, prejudice, cognition, and the self (see Sherman, Gawronski, 
& Trope, 2014 for a review). For instance, in the social perception realm, models of 
impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) distinguish between 
impressions formed via a more initial automatic, unconscious, and involuntary category 
judgment, relative to a more controlled, conscious, voluntary, and effortful individualized 
judgment. Spontaneous trait inferences by which traits are inferred directly based on 
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behavior consist of both automatic and controlled processes that can be activated 
simultaneously (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2014). The Associative-Propositional 
Evaluation (APE) Model distinguishes evaluative responses toward attitude objects that 
are based more in associative, relative to propositional processes (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). Whether evaluations activated by associative processes are 
consistent with propositional reasoning in a given context influences the degree to which 
more controlled processes are activated to influence judgments and behavior.  
 The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) is one of the more 
classical dual process theories, and distinguishes between persuasive attitude change that 
occurs via a less effortful, less elaborative, less motivated (peripheral) route relative to a 
more effortful, more elaborative, and more motivated (central) route. Motivation, as well 
as the availability and use of cognitive resources are requirements for increased message 
elaboration fundamental to persuasive attitude change via the central route to persuasion.   
 Not only can automatic mental components such as stereotypes and automatic 
prejudice influence explicit attitudes, judgments, and behaviors (Fazio & Olson, 2014; 
Sherman et al., 2014), but ambivalence caused by a mismatch between more explicitly 
generated attitudes and automatic mental processes can lead to greater deliberation and 
scrutiny (under conditions of high cognitive resources; Bodenhausen, Mccrae, & 
Sherman, 1999). Greater deliberation, scrutiny, and controlled processing is important to 
combatting the influence of automatic mental processes (i.e., stereotypes) on judgments 
and behaviors (Clark, Wegener, Brinol, & Petty, 2009), correcting for prejudices, and 
ultimately, reducing the expression of prejudices. In the present work, I consider what 
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may prompt egalitarian-oriented but automatically prejudiced individuals to notice their 
prejudices and then correct for their influence in judgments and behaviors.  
The MODE Model 
 The MODE model emphasizes the interplay between more controlled and 
automatic processes in attitude-behavior relations, as well as specifies the conditions 
under which bias correction is likely to occur (Fazio, 1990). Although the Mode Model 
could be applied to any context to understand the interplay of attitudes and motivation in 
predicting relevant judgments and behaviors (e.g., romantic relationships; McNulty, 
Olson, Meltzer, & Shaffer, 2013), it has been primarily applied to the dynamics of racial 
prejudice (see Fazio & Olson, 2014 for a review). The MODE Model aims to determine 
whether attitudes predict judgments and behavior in a more spontaneous (i.e., automatic), 
relative to more deliberative (controlled) manner. The MODE Model argues that 
automatic attitudes toward an attitude object are automatically-activated upon perception 
of that object. In the absence of motivation (e.g., accuracy, accountability, concern with 
social desirability, to control prejudice) and the opportunity (time and cognitive 
resources) for more motivated, controlled processes to operate, automatic attitudes are 
predicted to directly inform judgments and behaviors toward an attitude object. Applied 
to prejudice, under conditions of depleted cognitive resources or low motivation to 
control prejudice, automatically prejudiced individuals should favor White (relative to 
Black) targets behaviorally, as well as in terms of judgments and impressions.  
 However, when the opportunity to devote mental resources exists, motivated 
processes are able to exert an influence on judgments and behaviors that may steer 
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judgments and behavior away from those implied by one’s automatically-activated racial 
attitude. For instance, when sufficient time and cognitive resources exist, individuals 
highly motivated to control their prejudiced reactions can correct for their automatic 
racial attitudes. In instances of high motivation to avoid prejudice, individuals will rely 
on their own naïve subjective theories to determine their bias levels and to calibrate their 
behaviors and judgments (Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener, Petty, & Dunn, 1998; 
Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Of course, individuals may under-, appropriately, or over-
correct for their automatic biases in a given context, which could yield a variety of 
positive or negative consequences. However, when sufficient time and cognitive 
resources exist, as well as motivation to control prejudiced reactions, the tendency is that 
as prejudiced automatic racial attitudes increase, so too do pro-Black judgments and 
behaviors (Bodenhausen, Todd, & Richeson, 2009; Chien, Wegener, Petty, & Hsiao, 
2014; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Olson & Fazio, 
2004; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; Schuette & Fazio, 1995; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 
2003; Zabel & Olson, 2014). Thus, highly motivated White individuals correct for their 
automatic racial prejudices by favoring Black (relative to White) targets.  
Restraint and Concern Motivation  
 The effects of two factors of motivation to control prejudiced reactions have been 
well-documented in bias correction from a MODE Model perspective using Dunton and 
Fazio’s (1997) motivation to control prejudices (MCPR) questionnaire. The first factor, 
Concern With Appearing Prejudiced (henceforth referred to as Concern) consists of a 
personal desire to appear unprejudiced to oneself and to others, and includes items like “I 
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feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person.” Concern is 
positively correlated (r = .50) with humanitarianism-egalitarianism (Fazio & Hilden, 
2001) and internal motivation (r = .38) to control prejudice (IMS; Plant & Devine, 1998). 
IMS consists of a strong desire to avoid prejudiced reactions driven by internal forces and 
egalitarian values, as opposed to the potential social costs and norm-violation conflict 
linked with appearing prejudiced (Plant & Devine, 1998). IMS is linked with active 
efforts to facilitate positive interracial interactions (e.g., high interest in engaging with 
partner; Plant, 2004), as well as the goal pursuit of approaching egalitarianism (Plant, 
Devine, & Peruche, 2010). Indeed, in contrast to actively engaging in strategies to avoid 
the expression of prejudice (i.e., avoiding stereotypes, avoiding talking about sensitive 
topics, avoiding behavior that could be construed as prejudiced, keeping the conversation 
short), high IMS individuals tend to focus more on approaching interracial interactions 
with behaviors (i.e., smiling, asking questions, making eye contact, sharing self-
information) congruent with their egalitarian self-image. Concern’s correlation with IMS 
suggests that it too facilitates more of an approach-focus to interracial interactions.  
 High Concern is associated with reports of more positive intergroup contact with 
Black individuals in childhood (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2001). Moreover, high 
Concern individuals feel guilty when they violate internal standards regarding the 
expression of prejudices (Fazio & Hilden, 2001) and seem motivated to redress past 
racial inequalities (Fazio & Olson, 2014). In sum, research indicates that high Concern 
individuals have a strong egalitarian focus and desire to redress past inequalities which 
promotes an approach focus to interracial interaction. Such individuals, to the extent that 
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they harbor automatic racial biases, are akin to aversive racists (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986; Song Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008).   
 The second factor of the MCPR questionnaire, Restraint to Avoid Dispute 
(henceforth referred to as Restraint) entails a desire to avoid race-related conflict with or 
about Black individuals, and includes items like, “If I were participating in a class 
discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be 
hesitant to express my own viewpoint.” Restraint is linked with external motivation (r = 
.35) to control prejudice (EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998), which is a strong desire to avoid 
prejudiced reactions due to the social costs associated with violating social norms that 
discourage the expression of prejudices. EMS is linked with efforts to avoid prejudices in 
interracial interactions (e.g., avoiding interracial interactions; Plant, 2004), as well as the 
goal pursuit of avoiding prejudice (Plant et al., 2010). Instead of approaching interracial 
interactions with egalitarian-motivated behaviors, high EMS individuals actively engage 
in strategies to avoid the expression of prejudice (i.e., avoiding talking about sensitive 
topics, avoiding behavior that could be construed as prejudiced) to avoid the conflict and 
social costs associated with violating egalitarian social norms. Restraint’s correlation 
with EMS (and not IMS) suggests that it too facilitates more of an avoidance-focus to 
interracial interactions (Fazio & Olson, 2014).  
 High Restraint is associated with reduced and less positive contact with Blacks in 
childhood (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2001). Unlike Concern, Restraint is not tied to 
egalitarianism (Fazio & Hilden, 2001), indicating that for high Restraint individuals, the 
desire to avoid prejudice is more tied to potential social costs or ramifications than 
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violating an egalitarian-minded self-image. Both Concern and Restraint, when activated, 
moderate the impact of automatic prejudice on race-related judgments and behaviors. 
However, as I explain next, these motives may each be especially applicable, activated, 
and applied to prejudice correction in specific contexts depending on how social targets 
are construed.   
Target Construal, Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions, and Prejudice 
Correction  
 Intriguing trends have been observed with regard to the influence of Concern and 
Restraint in leading to correction for the effect of automatically-activated prejudice in 
behaviors and judgments. One point has to do with the contexts in which Restraint and 
Concern typically lead to corrective effects. Specifically, target construal may play an 
important role in whether Concern or Restraint is activated and in turn, leads to 
corrections for automatic prejudice. Social targets can be flexibly construed at the 
individual level, the category level, or somewhere in between (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, 
& Neuberg, 1999; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). I contend 
that it is likely that some perceiver motives are more relevant (and hence more 
influential) when social targets are construed at the individual level, whereas other 
motives are more relevant to impression formation when targets are construed at the 
category level. It is reasoned that Restraint, in being more conflict-avoidance-oriented, is 
more likely to be activated when social targets are construed at the individual level, since 
conflict is more likely to arise in interpersonal, individual-level interactions with others. 
Concern, in being more egalitarian-oriented and focused on equal treatment toward 
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Blacks, is more likely to be salient, activated, and operative in group contexts (Fazio & 
Olson, 2014). Thus, target construal may influence whether Restraint or Concern is 
activated in a given context, and in turn, moderates the effects of automatic prejudice on 
judgments and behaviors. 
 In support, Restraint has often yielded automatic prejudice correction effects 
when social targets are construed at the individual, relative to category level. In one study 
(Olson & Fazio, 2004), and consistent with the MODE Model (Fazio & Olson, 2014), 
automatically-activated attitudes directly predicted trait ratings toward Black and White 
targets among low Restraint individuals. However, among those high in Restraint, a 
pattern of correction emerged in which prejudiced Whites were more likely to give 
positive trait ratings of Black (relative to White) targets. A similar pattern of prejudice 
correction emerged among high Restraint individuals when asked to “describe their 
impressions of the typical Black male undergraduate” (Dunton & Fazio, 1997, pp. 322). 
In both cases, Restraint moderated the automatic attitudes-impressions relationship in 
contexts in which social targets were being construed at the individual level.  
 In comparison, Concern has demonstrated automatic prejudice correction effects 
when social targets are construed at the category (group), relative to individual level. For 
instance, Concern moderated the relationship between automatic prejudice and responses 
on the Modern Racism Scale (MRS), a measure of prejudice toward Blacks as a group 
(Fazio et al., 1995, see also Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Automatic 
prejudice directly predicted MRS scores for those low in Concern, but higher Concern 
participants corrected for their prejudice in responding to the MRS (Dunton & Fazio, 
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1997). As previously stated, we have reasoned that because Restraint is more conflict-
avoidance oriented, and Concern more egalitarian-oriented, that each is more likely to be 
activated in specific target construal contexts congruent with their underlying tenets. The 
findings highlighted above suggested that construal level might activate specific goal-
related motives that in turn would influence the expression of automatically-activated 
attitudes on behaviors and impressions.   
Empirical Examinations of Target Construal Effects in Bias Correction 
 Recently, I experimentally examined these possibilities (Zabel & Olson, 2014). 
Specifically, participants for whom Concern and Restraint scores were available were 
administered Fazio et al.’s (1995) affective priming task to assess automatic prejudice 
toward Blacks. Then, participants completed a task designed to encourage construal of 
social targets either at the individual or the category level. Following, participants 
provided impressions of Black and White targets as in previous research (Olson & Fazio, 
2004).  
 As expected, and consistent with the MODE Model (Fazio & Olson, 2014), 
automatic prejudice directly influenced impressions of Black relative to White targets 
among those less motivated to avoid prejudice. Correction for automatic prejudice was 
observed in the impressions of more motivated participants, but the application of 
different motives to control prejudice (i.e., Restraint and Concern) was dependent on 
target construal level. As expected, Restraint (and not Concern) led to more corrected 
impressions among participants construing targets at the individual level. That is, as 
expected, as Restraint increased, participants in the individual target construal condition 
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provided increasingly positive impressions toward Black (relative to White) targets as 
their automatic prejudice levels increased. The moderational role of Restraint in the 
automatic attitudes-trait impressions relationship both replicates and extends previous 
research (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Olson & Fazio, 2004) by demonstrating that Restraint is 
especially likely to be activated and operational in automatic prejudice correction within 
individual (but not category) target construal contexts.  
 Unexpectedly, a pattern of automatic prejudice correction among those high in 
Concern failed to emerge among those in the category construal condition. However, 
Concern was positively associated with trait ratings of both Black and White targets, as 
well as a relative preference for Black over White targets, albeit not significantly. As 
Concern increased, individuals tended to adopt a “like everyone” strategy when forming 
impressions of social targets and rated both Black and White targets as high in desirable 
traits. These correlations between Concern and trait ratings toward Black and White 
targets are in line with Concern’s focus on positive group treatment and an egalitarian 
orientation (Fazio & Hilden, 2001). The perplexing finding was that Concern increases 
did not lead to proportionately greater pro-Black trait ratings as automatically-prejudiced 
attitudes increased, as had been demonstrated by Restraint when social targets were 
construed at the individual level. In other words, high Concern individuals failed to 
correct for their automatic prejudice (Zabel & Olson, 2014).  
 These findings were replicated and extended in a second study (Zabel & Olson, 
2014) using a forced-choice impression formation paradigm in which participants directly 
compared Black and White targets. In this experiment, participants had to indicate a 
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preference between two simultaneously presented White and Black targets with regard to 
each of five desirable traits. I reasoned that once the “like everyone” option was revoked, 
and participants were forced to favor one social target over the other, high Concern 
individuals would be more likely to correct for their automatic prejudices in the category 
construal condition. Indeed, I expected that correcting for prejudices by favoring Black 
(relative to White) social targets would be more justifiable when participants were forced 
to favor one target over another.  
 However, results were consistent with previous findings (Zabel & Olson, 2014): 
Restraint moderated the relationship between automatic attitudes and trait ratings, with 
those high in Restraint correcting for their automatic prejudices in the revised trait 
impression task in the individual (but not category) target construal condition. However, 
once again, I found no interaction of Concern with automatically-activated attitudes in 
predicting impressions in the category (or individual) target construal condition. Just as 
before, Concern was positively correlated with trait ratings and pro-Black trait 
preferences regardless of participant automatic prejudice level (Zabel & Olson, 2014). 
Thus, findings from two studies indicate that high Restraint individuals tend to correct for 
their automatic biases in individual target construal contexts. High Concern individuals 
tend to utilize a “like everyone” (and “if you must choose, favor Blacks”) approach but 
fail to proportionately correct for their automatic biases in their subsequent judgments 
and behaviors. A critical research question then becomes why does this failure to correct 
for automatic biases exist among high Concern individuals? These findings (Zabel & 
Olson, 2014) raise the intriguing possibility that the very individuals who perceive 
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themselves as egalitarian and fair-minded may be the least likely to introspect and correct 
for their own automatic racial biases.  
Theoretical Perspectives Underlying a Lack of Bias Correction 
 There are at least two potential explanations as to why high Concern individuals 
may fail to correct for their automatic racial attitudes. I aim to test these alternative 
hypotheses in the proposed research: 1) High Concern individuals may lack the skill and 
experience to introspect (i.e., consciously look inward) on their automatic racial biases, 
and 2) High Concern individuals may find introspecting on their racial biases to be a 
threat to their egalitarian self-image. Each of these possibilities may influence high 
Concern Whites to employ “like everyone” and “prefer Black targets” heuristics in 
impression formation. These strategies, while leading to pro-Black judgments and 
behaviors, fail to account for the strength of one’s automatic racial attitudes in impression 
formation. The proposed research allows examination of the degree to which these 
potential explanations may be driving failure to introspect, and ultimately, failure to 
correct for automatic prejudices among egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals. 
Next, I highlight research on the process of introspection, given its predicted relevance to 
bias correction failures among high Concern individuals. Then, I more specifically hone 
in on why introspection failures may be occurring, and how the tendency for high 






 Introspection, or the conscious act of looking inward and “thinking about one’s 
thoughts and feelings” (Wilson et al., 1993, p. 331) has been a topic of interest among 
philosophers and psychologists for centuries (Hunt, 2007). Philosophers as early as 
Socrates were interested in how individuals acquire self-knowledge through the process 
of introspection. David Hume, in his “A Treatise of Human Nature” questions the 
capacity or ability of individuals to accurately introspect. Wilhelm Wundt severely 
questioned introspection as a proper means to inferring knowledge about human mental 
states and the self in an empirical, replicable manner (Blumenthal, 1975; Hunt, 2007). 
Although admitting introspection could be fallible, William James contended that it could 
be a valuable tool in experimental methods regarding more conscious mental processes, 
stating that “introspective observation is what individuals have to rely on first and 
foremost and always” (James, 1890, pp. 185). Of course, prominent psychologists (i.e., 
Sigmund Freud, John Watson) have pondered the structure, validity, utilization, and 
accessibility of introspective processes in psychology, albeit from very different 
theoretical orientations (Hunt, 2007).  
 Prior research differentiates between two forms of introspection: descriptive and 
explanatory (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007). Descriptive introspection focuses on the 
“what” components of self-knowledge; that is, the contents of self-knowledge regarding a 
particular attitude, aspect of the self-concept, feeling, or behavior. Explanatory 
introspection focuses on the “why” components of self-knowledge; that is, reflecting on 
reasons why one has a certain attitude, feeling, or behaves a certain way (Wilson, Dunn, 
15  
Kraft, & Lisle, 1989; Wilson et al., 1993). Explanatory introspection tends to lead to 
more inaccurate self-knowledge than descriptive introspection, given that it may be more 
prone to rationalization and availability cues (Hixon & Swann, 1993; Wilson, Dunn, 
Bybee, Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984). For instance, focusing on “what” their feelings 
actually were (as opposed to “why” they felt a particular way) increased correspondence 
between peoples’ self-reported affect and actual behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 
Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982), as well as implicit and explicit attitude 
measures (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008).  
Introspection Versus Awareness 
 To my knowledge, no research to date has examined the precise role that active 
introspection of automatic racial attitudes may play in bias correction. One recent 
theoretical perspective has begun to zero in on the important roles that both awareness 
and adjustment (motivation) may hold in bias correction. Specifically, Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Nosek, and Schmitt (2005) proposed a moderated consistency model for 
implicit and explicit attitudes, in which awareness “affects how strongly the conscious 
representation of an attitude reflects the implicit attitude, whereas adjustment affects how 
strongly the overt expression of an attitude depends on the preceding propositional 
representation” (Hofmann et al., 2005, pp. 28). From this theoretical orientation, 
awareness and adjustment are posited to interact to predict the correspondence between 
implicit attitudes and behaviors and judgments. One recent research study from this 
perspective indicates that a personality orientation toward self-awareness increases bias 
correction for automatic prejudices among individuals high in motivation to control 
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prejudiced reactions (Hofmann et al., 2005). Another recent research study indicates that 
a personality orientation toward self-awareness and a motivation to introspect may 
increase implicit prejudice-explicit measure correspondence (Gschwendner, Hofmann, & 
Schmitt, 2006). However, it is important to note that in neither of these studies was the 
active process of introspecting on automatic racial biases and subsequent impression 
formation repercussions examined, nor were the bias correction tendencies of egalitarian-
oriented (high Concern) individuals examined, which is central to the proposed work.  
From a Moderated Consistency Model perspective, awareness is posited to 
increase the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes, whereas adjustment 
(motivation) is posited to reduce implicit-explicit correspondence. However, it is 
important to note that awareness is distinct from introspection. For instance, awareness 
may be activated when individuals are primed with race (as in an Implicit Association 
task; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001; Plant et al., 2010; Strack & Deutsch, 
2014), but awareness does not necessarily lead to active introspection. Indeed, I contend 
that once awareness occurs, it is the nature of the adjustment motive (i.e., accuracy, 
motivation to control prejudiced reactions) that in turn either activates or fails to activate 
introspection. Although previous research indicates that motivation can enhance implicit-
explicit correspondence (Gschwendner et al., 2006; Phillips & Olson, 2014), I contend 
that the effects of awareness on implicit attitude-explicit measure correspondence are 
entirely dependent on the underlying nature of situationally-activated motives. For 
instance, activation of honesty or accuracy motivation may evoke greater introspection of 
automatic racial attitudes and implicit attitude-explicit measure correspondence (Phillips 
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& Olson, 2014; see also Gschwendner et al.’s 2006), whereas activation of conflict-
avoidance related motives may also evoke greater introspection of automatic racial 
attitudes but implicit attitude-explicit measure divergence. Furthermore, as the present 
study examines, activation of some prejudice-related motives (i.e., egalitarian-oriented 
motives) may squelch introspection of automatic racial attitudes among high Concern 
individuals (Zabel & Olson, 2014) in race-related contexts, leading to a failure to correct 
for automatic prejudices.  
Lacking the Skill to Introspect  
 In returning and focusing the lens to introspection, recall that one cognitive-based 
possibility as to why egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) Whites may fail to introspect on 
their automatic racial biases is because they lack the skill and experience to do so. 
Indeed, much research indicates that introspection is fallible and can actually be an 
inaccurate source of self-knowledge (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Another point is that 
human beings do not introspect nearly as much as our naïve theories may suggest 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982), suggesting that individuals generally may lack 
experience in introspection. Furthermore, introspection can actually hurt or damage self-
knowledge (Hodges & Wilson, 1993; Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989). Reasons-generated 
attitude change (Hodges & Wilson, 1993) argues that the process of looking within 
regarding one’s feelings or actions is prone to availability heuristic-related (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) pitfalls that influence an overreliance on easily verbalized, albeit 
incorrect reasons as a source of self-knowledge.  
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 In connecting introspection to dual process theories regarding the interplay of 
automatic and more controlled processes, automatic processes are argued to be less 
available to introspection (Wilson, 2009; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). Nevertheless, Wilson 
(2009) contends that “self-knowledge is less a matter of careful introspection than of 
becoming an excellent observer of oneself and deducing the nature of one’s nonconscious 
dispositions and preferences” (pp. 386). Thus, although Wilson (2009) seems to cast 
doubt that conscious (and accurate) introspection as to one’s automatic attitudes is 
probable, he does concede that self-knowledge as to automatic attitudes may be possible 
via implicitly inferring attitudes based on one’s behaviors and reactions. This latter point 
is congruent with previous empirical research from a self-perception theory perspective 
(Bem, 1967; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988; Wells & Petty, 1980). Wilson’s (2009) 
research and the aforementioned research (Hodges & Wilson, 1993; Nisbett and Wilson, 
1977; Wilson et al., 1989) suggest that individuals may lack skill in introspection and 
may have a reduced capacity to accurately introspect on more automatic psychological 
processes.   
 Importantly, egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals may especially lack 
skill in introspecting on their automatic racial biases, relative to conflict avoidance-
oriented (high Restraint) individuals, perhaps in large part due to a lack of experience. 
Indeed, it would be essential for high Restraint Whites to introspect on their automatic 
prejudices more frequently to avoid bi-directional sources of conflict associated with both 
appearing prejudiced and bending over backward toward Blacks. High Concern 
individuals, in having the unidirectional goal of avoiding prejudice, would not need to 
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introspect on their automatic racial attitudes in order to fulfill activated Concern goals. In 
the present research, I examine the degree to which lacking the experience and skill to 
introspect may be driving high Concern individuals’ tendencies to avoid correction for 
automatic prejudices in impression formation.  
Motivational Influences on Introspection 
Another motivationally-based possibility is that high Concern individuals do have 
the capacity to accurately introspect on their automatic racial biases, but avoid doing so 
to preserve their egalitarian self-image. Of course, fundamental to a motivational 
perspective is that high Concern individuals do have the capacity and skill to accurately 
introspect on their automatic racial biases, a tenet congruent with recent research. 
Specifically, individuals can accurately introspect on their automatic racial attitudes 
under certain motivated (i.e., motivation for accuracy) conditions (Phillips & Olson, 
2014). I contend that high Concern individuals may be motivated to avoid introspection, 
given that doing so would be a threat to their egalitarian self-image. This avoidance, in 
turn, leads to a failure to correct for automatic biases.  
In contrast, for high Restraint Whites, introspecting on automatic racial attitudes 
is likely not threatening to their self-image, given that their motive to avoid prejudice is 
more externally-driven. Such reasoning is consistent with findings that high Restraint 
individuals correct for their automatic prejudices in trait judgments, whereas high 
Concern individuals fail to correct proportionately for their automatic prejudices (Zabel 
& Olson, 2014). Of course, this perspective implies that the process of introspecting on 
automatic racial biases should increase bias correction among high Concern Whites. In 
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what follows, I lay out theoretical perspectives supporting the notion that introspecting on 
automatic racial biases may threaten the self-image of high Concern Whites that in turn 
squelches bias correction, before moving on to examining possibilities for reducing the 
self-image threat of introspection.  
Several theoretical positions support the possibility that a threat to the self-image 
of high Concern individuals is the primary mechanism driving failure to introspect and 
subsequently, a failure to correct for automatic biases. For instance, self-discrepancy 
theory (Higgins, 1987) states that a discrepancy between one’s ought (i.e., “I should treat 
everyone the same”) and actual self (i.e., “I am prejudiced at some level”) is threatening 
to one’s self-image and can lead to anxiety (Higgins, 1987). Thus, avoiding introspection 
on one’s racial attitudes may be a strategy high Concern individuals use to avoid a clash 
between actual and ought selves. Relatedly, self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972) argues that increased self-focused attention (i.e., introspection) leads to a greater 
likelihood of experiencing discrepancies between one’s ought and actual self that might 
lead to anxiety. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) argues that a context in 
which one has two related but incompatible thoughts is an anxiety-producing situation 
that one is motivated to escape. Self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1969; 1999) extends 
cognitive dissonance theory by arguing that dissident cognitions are anxiety-producing 
and aversive to the extent to which they contradict a person’s self-concept. These theories 
share in common that a mismatch between thoughts or behaviors that have implications 
for one’s self-image is an aversive, threatening experience that one is motivated to avoid.  
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 Another theoretical model that emphasizes the potential threat of appearing 
prejudiced to those with implicitly-prejudiced but explicitly unprejudiced attitudes and 
egalitarian-activated motives is the Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses Model 
(Monteith, 1993). This model attests that stereotypes are automatically-activated among 
perception of a Black target that may influence White individuals to behave in a 
discrepant way from their egalitarian motives. This experience is posited to be aversive 
and laden with negative affect (e.g., guilt) for White individuals, leading to the 
development of cues for control that help reduce such aversive behaviors. Individuals for 
whom egalitarian concepts are chronically-activated have even demonstrated reduced 
stereotype activation as a self-regulatory strategy (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & 
Schall, 1999). Fundamental to the Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses Model is that 
a discrepancy between behavior and explicit racial attitudes or egalitarian motives is a 
threatening, uncomfortable experience that individuals are motivated to avoid (see 
Monteith & Mark, 2005 for a review). 
  Perhaps most directly, Aversive Racism Theory may shine light on why 
egalitarian-oriented (high Concern), but automatically prejudiced individuals are failing 
to introspect on their automatic prejudices (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The theory 
argues that although aversive racists seek to maintain an egalitarian self-image and self-
report unprejudiced attitudes toward Blacks, such individuals still harbor negative biases 
that can be revealed by implicit measures. Thus, according to Aversive Racism theory, an 
aversive racist is characterized by positive, self-reported racial attitudes and an egalitarian 
self-concept, but more negative, prejudicial automatic racial attitudes (Dovidio & 
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Gaertner, 2004). In other words, high Concern and automatic prejudice defines such 
individuals (Song Hing et al., 2008).  
 Situations in which prejudice concerns are salient and inescapable are theorized to 
be especially threatening to aversive racists, as such situations may force aversive racists 
to face the conflict between their egalitarian self-image and their automatic racial 
prejudices, increasing the likelihood of automatic prejudice unwittingly influencing their 
behaviors. Indeed, this latter viewpoint is buttressed by interracial interaction research 
indicating that automatic prejudice can “leak” into one’s nonverbal behavior (Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), which in turn can have negative consequences for an 
interaction (Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; but see Shelton, Richeson, 
Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005).  
Fundamental to Aversive Racism Theory is that White individuals engage in 
specific strategies to maintain an egalitarian self-image in contexts in which automatic 
prejudices are often unacknowledged, but that automatic prejudices may still lead to 
discriminatory actions in insidious ways (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). For instance, 
aversive racists avoid race-related contexts which may force them to confront their 
egalitarian self-image and underlying automatic prejudices (Gaertner, 1973). However, 
when enough contextual information or ambiguity exists for a non-race based attribution 
to account for favoring White targets (e.g., less normative concerns and additional target 
information), the automatic prejudices of aversive racists tend to unwittingly influence 
behaviors and judgments (i.e., favoring White relative to Black targets; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000; Gaertner, 1973; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Song Hing et al., 
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2008). Indeed, with increasing contextual information and attributional ambiguities, 
favoring Whites is no longer a self-image threat to aversive racists. Aversive racists tend 
to avoid favoring Whites only when norms are clear (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; 
Gaertner, 1973; Hodson et al., 2002; Song Hing et al., 2008; see Pearson, Dovidio, & 
Gaertner, 2009 for a review).   
 Recall that my research thus far indicates that high Concern individuals tend to 
employ a “like everyone” approach in impression formation (Zabel & Olson, 2014) and 
prefer Blacks when forced to choose between Black and White targets (Zabel & Olson, 
2014). In both, cases, however, high Concern individuals do not correct proportionately 
for their automatic racial attitudes in trait judgments. This is in stark contrast to more 
conflict avoidance oriented (high Restraint) individuals, who correct for their automatic 
prejudices. Thus far, I have highlighted theoretical support for the notion that a mismatch 
between automatic prejudices and egalitarian-motives is a self-image threat to high 
Concern White individuals that is aversive and anxiety-producing. I contend that failing 
to introspect on one’s automatic racial attitudes is a strategy that protects the self-concept 
of high Concern individuals from the threat of a mismatch between their egalitarian self-
image and prejudiced automatic racial attitudes.  
 Once forced to introspect on their automatic racial biases, and unable to avoid the 
self-image threat, I expect high Concern Whites to correct for their automatic racial 
attitudes in a manner congruent with previous research (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Olson & 
Fazio, 2004; Zabel & Olson, 2014). Indeed, once a self-image threat cannot be avoided, 
automatic bias corrections (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Olson & Fazio, 
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2004; Wegener & Petty, 1997) become the optimal strategy for high Concern individuals 
in order to “save face” and preserve their egalitarian self-image. Indeed, this reasoning is 
congruent with previous research in which egalitarian-oriented Whites only expressed 
interest in a prejudice correction program under instances of greater race saliency or 
awareness (Plant et al., 2010). Indeed, only in instances when a self-image threat cannot 
be avoided would greater and accurate racial attitude introspection be most functional for 
egalitarian-oriented individuals. A motivation mechanism perspective provides an 
alternative to a more cognitive (i.e., lack of skill) perspective in understanding why 
egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals may fail to introspect on their automatic 
racial biases. Furthermore, each provides alternative explanations for the findings of 
previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014).  
 Although beneficial to protecting egalitarian-oriented White individuals’ self-
images, failing to introspect on automatic biases could ironically lead egalitarian-minded 
Whites to engage in behaviors or judgments that proportionately do not correct for 
automatic attitudes. This is an important distinction to examine, as the very people most 
concerned about redressing past inequalities and fair treatment may be the most unlikely 
to correct for their own automatic racial biases due to the potency of self-image threat. If 
this is found to be the case in the present research, a crucial research question then 
becomes how can the tendency for high Concern White individuals to introspect on their 
automatic racial biases be increased? Increasing introspection would be crucial to leading 
to more appropriate corrections for automatic prejudice that may have significant positive 
intergroup consequences. One potential mechanism to reduce the threat of introspecting 
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on racial biases for high Concern individuals may be self-affirmations, which I turn to 
next.  
Self-Affirmation Theory 
 Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) contends that individuals engage in a 
variety of strategies to affirm the self when a threat to one’s self-image is derived from 
either meta-perception of others or one’s own behavior. According to self-affirmation 
theory, the purpose of the self is to “maintain a perception of global integrity and overall 
moral and adaptive adequacy’’ (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993, p. 885). Self-
affirmations not only reaffirm the threatened self, but also preemptively protect against 
future threats (Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele et al., 1997; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). 
Moreover, self-affirmations are flexible in protecting the self in that they do not have to 
be domain-related to the nature of the threat itself. For instance, in one study, self-
affirmations (i.e., writing about one’s positive features) led smokers to be more open to 
self-threatening graphic smoking images that demonstrated the dangers of smoking 
relative to those in a non-self-affirmation control condition (Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & 
Napper, 2007; see also Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 2008). Other research 
indicated that self-affirmations can buffer against physiological stress responses to 
presenting an impromptu speech (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) and to 
stressful midterm examinations (Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009). Indeed, 
the ability of self-affirmations to buffer against a broad range of psychological threats is 
conceptualized in its inclusion as part of the psychological immune system (Gilbert, 
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998).  
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 Other research indicates that a self-affirmation can preemptively reduce the threat 
of a self-threatening upward social comparison, as well as reduce the implications of a 
social comparison threat after experience of that threat (Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Self-
affirmations buffer against the tendency for White individuals to derogate out-group 
members as a self-affirmation strategy (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Moreover, evidence 
suggests that individuals are more likely to pay attention to self-disconfirming and 
incongruent information following a self-affirmation, suggesting that confirmation bias 
tendencies may be reduced following a self-affirmation (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 
2000). In short, in situations in which an individual’s self-integrity is threatened in any 
manner, affirming any aspect of the self can serve as a preemptive tool or solution to 
mitigate the effect of that threat on behavior.  
 In refocusing the lens to my core research question, it is likely that a self-
affirmation could buffer against the threat of introspection to the self-images of high 
Concern Whites. A self-affirmation would allow high Concern individuals the “self-
credits” (Monin & Miller, 2001) to introspect on their automatic racial biases, which 
otherwise would be an overly threatening and aversive experience. I contend this 
introspection, in turn, may be essential in leading to corrections for automatic prejudice 
among high Concern Whites. In the present study, I examine whether a self-affirmation 
bolsters the self-integrity of egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals sufficiently 
to mitigate the threat of introspecting on their automatic biases. 
 Self-affirmations appear to be most effective in reducing the potential threat of 
stimuli or contexts (Sherman & Hartson, 2011). Thus, if self-affirmations enhance the 
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degree to which high Concern individuals correct for their automatic biases under 
conditions of introspection, it is likely that introspection’s bias correcting effect is being 
driven by reducing self-image threat. Additionally, the results of other studies (Zabel & 
Olson, 2014) showing a lack of automatic prejudice correction among egalitarian-
oriented (high Concern) could then be explained by a failure to introspect due to a self-
image threat.  
 However, if self-affirmations fail to moderate the expected effect of introspection 
on automatic prejudice correction among egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals, 
then it will become less likely that a motivationally-driven mechanism to avoid self-
image threat is driving introspection failure among high Concern Whites. In this case, it 
would become more likely that mechanistic explanations are more cognitive in nature, 












Chapter 2: Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
 In the current research, I measured Concern and Restraint motivation to control 
prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997), as well as automatically-activated racial 
attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995). Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to 
engage in a self-affirming activity (or not), as well as to either introspect on their 
automatic racial attitudes (or not) in a counterbalanced fashion. In all conditions, race-
related awareness was held consistent. All participants next completed an impression 
formation task of Black and White group and individual targets (Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
Relevant potential individual difference moderators (e.g., Private and Public Self-
Consciousness: Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1974), as well as explicit measures of 
prejudice (e.g., Symbolic Racism: Henry & Sears, 2002) were also assessed.  
Replicating previous research, I expected high Concern (but not Restraint) 
individuals to provide more positive trait ratings toward both Black and White individual 
and group targets. However, I expect that egalitarian-oriented (high Concern) individuals 
do have access to the content of their automatic racial attitudes and are subsequently able 
to correct for the influence of their automatic prejudices under the right conditions. 
Specifically, in the current research, I expected that correction for automatic prejudice 
would be greatest among high Concern individuals who first were self-affirmed and then 
introspected on their racial biases. Precisely, I expected self-affirmations to reduce the 
self-image threat of introspecting on racial prejudices among high Concern Whites. I 
expected this in turn to lead to greater and more accurate racial attitude introspection 
29  
among high Concern Whites, congruent with previous research indicating that individuals 
do have access to the content of their automatic racial attitudes (Phillips & Olson, 2014). 
Once introspection as to one’s racial attitudes occurred, I expected correction for 
automatic prejudices to become the default strategy among high Concern Whites, in 
patterns analogous to those verified in previous research (Fazio & Olson, 2014). Given 
Restraint motivation’s conflict avoidance focus, I expected that it would not interact with 

















Chapter 3: Method 
Participants  
 A total of 228 (106 female and 122 male) White undergraduates completed the 
experiment for credit in their psychology courses. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Motivation to control prejudiced reactions (MCPR). Upon signing up for the 
primary study and prior to their arrival to the laboratory, participants completed an online 
version of Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) 17-item Motivation to Control Prejudiced 
Reactions (MCPR) questionnaire to assess Concern and Restraint motivations. 
Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with a variety of statements such as, 
“If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion 
with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint” (Restraint) and 
“I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person” (Concern) 
using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response range. In the current study, α 
= 0.82. Descriptive statistics for all variables are located in Table 1. Furthermore, 
descriptive statistics for all variables split by experimental condition are located in Tables 
2-6. All tables and figures are located in the appendices.  
 Upon first arriving to the laboratory, participants were seated at individual 
cubicles containing computer monitors at which they completed all subsequent tasks. 
Participants were told the experiment was about first impressions and would also involve 
categorizing visual stimuli. After consenting to participate, participants first completed 
two individual difference measures relevant to the primary hypotheses.  
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Private self-consciousness. First, participants completed Fenigstein et al.’s 
(1975) 10-item private self-consciousness scale as an individual difference level 
assessment of general introspective tendencies and self-awareness. Participants rated the 
degree to which a variety of statements, such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” 
and “I reflect about myself a lot” were characteristic of them using a 0 (extremely 
uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic) response range. In the current study, α = 
0.49. 
 Public self-consciousness. Participants next completed Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) 
7-item public self-consciousness scale as an individual difference level assessment of 
general social self-awareness. Participants rated the degree to which a variety of 
statements, such as “I get embarrassed very easily” and “Large groups make me nervous” 
were characteristic of them using a 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely 
characteristic) response range. In the current study, α = 0.78. 
 Automatic prejudice. Following completion of these two individual difference 
measures, participants completed the core measures and experimental manipulations. 
First, participants completed Fazio et al.’s (1995) unobtrusive priming measure of 
automatically-activated racial attitudes. Block 1 was comprised of practice trials, where 
each of sixteen adjectives was presented to participants, which they categorized as either 
positive or negative. Blocks 2 through Block 5 contained the critical trials. Participants 
were told that this part of the experiment concerned their ability to perform two tasks 
simultaneously. On a given trial, a face prime was presented prior to each adjective. 
Participants were instructed to pay attention to the faces because they would be asked 
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questions about them later, but only to respond to the valence of each target adjective. 
Participants were instructed to complete the task as quickly and accurately as possible. 
 The primes were 24 photos of faces of various races. Of the faces, 8 were White, 
8 were Black, and 8 were fillers of White and other-raced faces to obscure my interest in 
race. The primes were gender-balanced, such that there was an equivalent number of 
female and male Black, White, and other-race primes. On each trial, a prime was 
presented for 315 ms, followed by a 135 ms interval, followed by the target adjective (the 
same 16 target adjectives used in Block 1). Thirty-two of the 48 trials presented in Blocks 
2-5 consisted of critical pairs of photos matched by target adjective and sex but varying 
by race. Over the course of Blocks 2-5, each member of each Black and White photo 
prime pair was presented four times with the same positive and negative target adjectives, 
resulting in a total of 128 critical trials. Participants’ responses and latencies in 
categorizing the target adjectives as a function of race prime (Black vs. White) were 
recorded on each trial for later use in computing automatically-activated racial attitudes. 
  Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
complete a frequently-used (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006; Fein & Spencer, 1997; 
Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000) self-affirmation (SA) manipulation or not. Participants 
assigned to the SA condition ranked a list of 11 provided topics in terms of personal 
importance. Following, they described their most important value and the reason for its 
singular importance, as well as provided an example from their life that demonstrated the 
importance of that value to them. 
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 Introspection manipulation. First, I utilized a prompt to minimize race-related 
awareness differences between racial attitude introspection conditions. Specifically, all 
participants in all conditions read the following instructions on their computers: “Part of 
the importance of participating in psychology research at the University of Tennessee is 
to complement and extend your classroom learning. Next, you will read about a research 
finding that has been well-supported in previous research to enhance the value of this 
experiment to your learning, prior to moving on to the next part of the experiment.” All 
participants next read the following statement on their computer screens “Automatic 
prejudices (negative feelings toward Black Americans) are pervasive in American 
society. Most Americans are prejudiced toward Black Americans, even if they are not 
aware of this bias. This is an important finding in contemporary psychology, and thus 
relevant to bring to your attention today.” This prompt rules out racial awareness 
differences among the racial attitude introspection conditions.  
 Participants were then randomly assigned to either undergo a racial attitudes 
introspection manipulation or not. Participants in the introspection condition read and 
responded to the following statements: “In the next part of the experiment, please take a 
few minutes to reflect on your initial "gut feelings" and racial attitudes (feelings) toward 
Black Americans. Think about what your "gut feelings" and racial attitudes are toward 
Black Americans, and take a few minutes to write about these feelings. This task will 
help organize your thoughts for tasks later in the experiment.” In comparison, control 
condition participants did not engage in introspection. The introspection manipulation 
was formulated loosely based on previous research (Sedikides et al., 2007). Participants 
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completed the introspection and self-affirmation manipulations in a counter-balanced 
fashion.  
 Impression formation task. Following the self-affirmation and introspection 
manipulations, participants completed a trait rating task in which they formed 
impressions of 25 specific individuals and 25 specific groups depicted in various 
occupational and everyday settings. Regarding the individual photos, nine individuals 
were fillers of White, Arab, and Latino individuals included to obscure the nature of the 
task (no mention of our interest in race was made). The remaining 16 individual photos 
consisted of eight critical Black and eight critical White individuals previously matched 
by sex, as well as status and independence of their occupation (Fazio & Dunton, 1997). 
Female pairs consisted of a Black receptionist matched with a White business woman, a 
Black nurse matched with a White pharmacist, a Black repair woman matched with a 
White painter, and a Black cashier matched with a White police officer. Male pairs 
consisted of a Black minister matched with a White professor, a Black businessman 
matched with a White architect, a Black gardener matched with a White sanitation 
worker, and a Black potter matched with a White brick layer. These photos have been 
utilized several times in previous research as a dependent variable measure of pro-Black 
trait ratings (Olson & Fazio, 2004; Zabel & Olson, 2014).  
 Participants also formed impressions of 25 groups, nine of which were fillers of 
White, Arab, and Latino individuals. The remaining 16 group photos consisted of eight 
critical Black and eight critical White groups previously pilot-tested to be equivalent on 
dimensions such as likeability and matched by occupation (e.g., sanitation worker) or 
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general characteristics (e.g., college students). Critical female pairs consisted of Black 
and White bridal parties, business women, conference goers, and college groups. Critical 
male pairs consisted of Black and White lawyers, firefighters, sanitation workers, and 
basketball teams.  
For each individual or group target photo, participants rated the degree to which 
each individual or group possessed each of five desirable traits (i.e., intelligent, 
industrious, likeable, honest, reliable) using a 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much so) scale. 
Presentation order of the targets was randomized, but participants always completed the 
five trait ratings in a fixed order above before moving on to the next target. Furthermore, 
the presentation order of whether participants completed all the individual or group target 
ratings first was counterbalanced. Reaction times for each participant’s judgments were 
recorded.  
 Pro-black/anti-black attitudes. Following the impression formation task, 
participants completed Katz and Hass’s (1988) 10-item pro-Black and 10-item anti-Black 
attitude questionnaire. Pro-Black attitude questions consisted of items such as “Many 
Whites show a real lack of understanding of the problems that Blacks face” and “Blacks 
have more to offer than they have been allowed to show,” and anti-black attitude 
questions consisted of items such as “On the whole, Black people don't stress education 
and training,” and “One of the biggest problems for a lot of Blacks is their lack of self-
respect.” Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each statement using a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) response range. In the current study, internal 
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reliabilities for the pro-Black and anti-Black attitude questionnaires were 0.56 and 0.67, 
respectively.  
  Subtle and blatant prejudice. Subsequently, participants completed Pettigrew 
and Meertens’s (1995) 8-item subtle prejudice scale and 8-item blatant prejudice scale. 
Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each of the subtle (e.g., “Black 
Americans here should not push themselves where they are not wanted”) and blatant 
(e.g., “White and Black Americans can never be really comfortable with each other, even 
if they are close friends”) prejudice items using, for the most part, a 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) response range. However, some of the scale items consisted of 
varying response ranges (e.g., four response options instead of five). Thus, the z scores of 
all items were calculated prior to computing reliabilities and individual mean scores on 
each scale. In the current study, internal reliabilities for the subtle and blatant prejudice 
scales were 0.80 and 0.76, respectively. 
 Symbolic racism. Following, participants completed the symbolic racism 2000 
scale (Henry & Sears, 2002). Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with 
statements such as “It’s really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if 
Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites,” and “Over the 
past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve” (reverse-coded) using a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) response range. However, one scale item 
consisted of only three response options (relative to four). Thus, the z scores of all items 
were calculated, prior to computing the scale reliability and individual mean score. In the 
current study, α = 0.70. Following, participants completed demographic items assessing 
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their sex and race. Furthermore, they completed an open response item, in which they 
responded to the following statement: “What are your general feelings about this 
experiment? Do you have any thoughts about what research questions this experiment is 
examining?” Subsequently, participants were debriefed about the true nature of the 
experiment and dismissed.  
 Self-affirmation manipulation coding. Following completion of the study, three 
White, female laboratory research assistants individually rated the extent to which 
participants followed the self-affirmation directions in the experimental (affirmation) 
condition using a 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely well) response range. They also rated how 
affirmed they thought the participant would be after writing their statement using a 0 (not 
at all) to 4 (extremely) response range. Additionally, the number of words written in each 
self-affirmation statement was recorded.   
 Introspection manipulation coding. The same laboratory research assistants also 
rated the extent to which participants followed the introspection directions in the 
experimental (introspection) condition using a 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely well) 
response range. They also reported how negatively-biased participants admitted to being 
against African-Americans using a 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) response range. As an 
additional measure, they reported, based on their own general and more subjective 
impressions, how racially biased the participant seemed to be using a 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely) response range. Additionally, the number of words written in each 
introspection statement was recorded.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Data Preparation 
 Motivation to control prejudiced reactions. Replicating previous research 
(Dunton & Fazio, 1997, Olson & Fazio, 2004), concern and restraint motivational factors 
emerged in principal component analysis using varimax rotation. I used the factor score 
coefficients to compute the two factor scores for participants. One participant scored 
greater than three standard deviations from the mean (i.e., z = -3.47) in Concern 
motivation, and thus was removed from primary analyses.  
 Automatic prejudice. One participant was removed from primary analyses for 
having error rates of greater than 30% on critical trials (i.e., 35.20% of trials). Consistent 
with previous research (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), one participant was 
removed from primary analyses for taking longer than 2000 ms to categorize target words 
on more than 10% of trials (i.e., 68.00% of trials). Critical trials of which responses were 
incorrect (2.65% of cases) or in which raw latencies were less than 300 (<.01% of cases) 
or greater than 2000 ms (<.01% of cases) were removed prior to aggregation. Then, all 
response latencies were reciprocally-transformed to better approximate normality. Using 
reciprocally-transformed response latencies, I computed participants’ mean response 
latency difference scores on critical trials in which a Black prime preceded a negative, 
relative to a positive adjective, as well as on critical trials in which a White prime 
preceded a negative, relative to a positive adjective. Next, we subtracted participants’ 
scores on the latter difference score from their scores on the former difference score to 
derive an automatically-activated racial attitude estimate used in primary analyses. 
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Positive scores indicated pro-White automatically-activated attitudes. Automatic attitude 
estimates ranged from -.00035 to .00043 (M = .00004, SD = .00013; raw M = 13.74, raw 
SD = 68.48), were positively-distributed (144 of the 228 scores were positive), and 
differed from 0, t (227) = 4.37, p < .001, indicating a tendency for pro-White 
automatically-activated attitudes. One participant had an automatic attitude estimate 
greater than three standard deviations from the mean (i.e., z = 3.02), and was removed 
from primary analyses.  
 Trait ratings. The trait ratings were highly correlated within critical individual 
and group targets. Reliability analyses revealed coefficient alphas ranging from .72 to .88 
across critical individual target photos (αM = .83), and from .81 to .90 across critical 
group photos (αM = .85). Thus, I combined the five traits into a single mean for each 
target across the critical individual and group targets. I then computed difference scores 
indicative of Pro-Black individual and group trait ratings for the matched pairs. 
Specifically, I subtracted participants’ mean individual trait ratings of critical White 
targets from their mean individual trait ratings of critical Black targets (separately for 
both individuals and groups). Positive difference scores represented more favorable trait 
ratings of Black, relative to White targets. Pro-Black individual trait rating difference 
scores ranged from -1.58 to 1.33 (M = .07, SD = .38), whereas Pro-Black group trait 
rating difference scores ranged from -.55 to 2.20 (M = .45, SD = .40). The mean of 
individual Pro-Black trait rating difference scores differed from 0, t (227) = 2.95, p < .01, 
as did the mean of group Pro-Black group rating difference scores, t (203) = 16.23, p < 
.001, indicating a tendency for participants to indicate more favorable trait ratings of 
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Black individual and group targets relative to White targets. This difference is consistent 
with previous research showing more positive reported impressions of Blacks relative to 
Whites (e.g., Biernat & Vescio, 1993). A paired-samples t-test indicated that pro-Black 
ratings toward group targets were more favorable than those toward individual targets, t 
(203) = -13.43, p < .001. Additionally, given the positive correlation between pro-Black 
group and individual ratings (r = .49, p < .001), I created a variable that collapsed across 
group and individual targets in which I subtracted participants’ mean trait ratings toward 
both White group and individual targets from participants’ mean trait ratings toward both 
Black group and individual targets. These Pro-Black difference scores ranged from -.88 
to 1.40 (M = .24, SD =.34), and were significantly different from 0, t (227) = 10.55, p < 
.001.    
Four participants’ pro-Black difference scores collapsed across group and 
individual targets were greater than three standard deviations from the mean (i.e., z’s = 
3.00, -3.22, -3.26, & 3.42), and these participants were omitted from primary analyses. 
Additionally, examination of free responses at the end of the experiment uncovered that 
four participants were precisely aware of either the true purpose of the study or how 
automatically-activated attitudes were assessed within the study. Due to concerns 
regarding demand characteristics, these participants were omitted from primary analyses. 
Finally, a thorough look at the data set uncovered one participant who responded almost 
exclusively to the trait rating task with the rating of “7” (i.e., toward 82.4% of targets). 
Furthermore, this participant frequently made judgments in less than 300 ms, suggesting 
disengagement within the trait rating task. Thus, this participant was removed from 
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primary analyses. Removing the aforementioned outliers did not alter the patterns of the 
effects highlighted in the following primary analyses.  
Self-affirmation manipulation coding. Self-affirmation word count (M = 74.12, 
SD = 41.96) was conducted by a trained research assistant, whereas three research 
assistants rated the degree to which each participant followed directions and the degree to 
which each participant self-affirmed based on their written statement. Research assistant 
ratings on the degree to which participants followed directions were highly correlated (all 
r’s > .59, p’s < .001, Mr = .67). Research assistant ratings on the degree to which each 
participant self-affirmed based on their written statement were also highly correlated (all 
r’s > .54, p’s < .001, Mr = .61). Thus, the composite of the ratings provided by the three 
research assistants for each rating among each participant were averaged for use in 
primary analyses.  
Introspection manipulation coding. Introspection word count (M = 58.19, SD = 
36.40) was conducted by a trained research assistant, whereas three research assistants 
rated the degree to which each participant followed directions, admitted to being 
negatively biased against African-Americans, and appeared to be racially biased based on 
their own subjective impressions. Correlations between research assistant ratings on the 
degree to which each participant followed directions (all r’s > .44, p’s < .001, Mr = .45), 
admitted to being negatively-biased toward African-Americans (all r’s > .67, p’s < .001, 
Mr = .70), and appeared to be racially biased based on their own subjective impressions 
(all r’s > .54, p’s < .001, Mr = .59) were all moderately to strongly correlated. Thus, the 
composite of the ratings provided by the three research assistants for each rating among 
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each participant were averaged together for use in primary analyses. Further correlational 
analyses indicated that research assistant perceptions of the degree to which participants 
admitted bias were highly correlated with their own subjective perceptions of bias (r = 
.82, p < .001). Thus, the mean of these ratings was used to represent the degree to which 
participants admitted bias within their introspective responses in primary analyses 
(henceforth referred to as Introspected Prejudice).   
Preliminary Analyses 
 Regarding overall trait ratings aggregated across race, a one-way ANOVA 
indicated that the five experimental conditions did not differ with regard to overall mean 
trait ratings toward critical targets, F (4, 210) = 1.67, p = .16. Additionally, no 
statistically significant differences emerged between experimental conditions regarding 
trait ratings toward overall individual targets, F (4, 210) = 1.69, p = .15. A marginally 
significant difference emerged between experimental conditions regarding overall trait 
ratings toward group targets, F (4, 210) = 2.17, p = .08. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed 
that participants in the Control condition demonstrated marginally lower overall group 
target trait ratings (M = 4.89, SD = .54) than those in the Self-Affirmation Only condition 
(M = 5.23, SD = .65), p = .09. No differences emerged in overall ratings toward Black 
targets, F (4, 210) = 1.44, p = .22, or White targets, F (4, 210) = 1.99, p = .10, as a 
function of experimental condition.  
No differences between experimental conditions in pro-Black individual trait 
ratings, F (4, 210) = .19, p = .94, or group trait ratings emerged, F (4, 210) = .99, p = .42. 
However, a marginally significant difference emerged between experimental conditions 
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regarding pro-Black overall trait ratings, F (4, 210) = 2.25, p = .07. Tukey post-hoc tests 
revealed that participants in the Introspection Only condition (M = .13, SD = .25) 
expressed lower pro-Black overall trait ratings than those in the Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second condition (M = .32, SD = .32, p = .05). Automatic attitude estimates 
and motivation factor scores did not vary by condition.  
 Consistent with previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014), Concern motivation 
was correlated with overall trait ratings toward group (r = .34, p < .001) and individual (r 
= .30, p < .001) targets. In comparison, Restraint motivation was not correlated with 
overall trait ratings toward individual (r = -.01, p = .94) or group (r = -.00, p = .96) 
targets. Consistent with previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014), Concern was positively 
correlated with overall trait ratings (r = .58, p < .001), as well as overall trait ratings 
toward individual (r = .56, p < .001) and group (r = .56, p < .001) targets among 
participants in the Control condition. Furthermore, Concern was positively correlated 
with overall trait ratings toward Black (r = .61, p < .001) and White (r = .48, p < .001) 
targets, as well as ratings toward Black individual (r = .57, p < .001), Black group (r = 
.59, p < .001), White individual (r = .47, p < .001), and White group (r = .45, p < .001) 
targets among Control condition participants. Consistent with previous research (Zabel & 
Olson, 2014), Concern was weakly positively correlated with pro-Black group trait 
ratings (r = .22, p = .16) among Control condition participants. Furthermore, Concern 
was positively correlated with pro-Black individual trait ratings (r = .24, p = .12), as well 
as pro-Black overall trait ratings (r = .26, p < .10), albeit not significantly. These 
correlations are generally congruent with the “like everyone” strategy that high Concern 
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individuals tend to employ (Zabel & Olson, 2014). In comparison, in the Control 
condition, Restraint was not significantly correlated with any of the trait ratings, be they 
group, individual, Black, White, or a difference score comparing races (all r’s < | .17 |, 
p’s > .29).  
Primary Analyses 
 Analysis strategy. First, I report on the degree to which participants’ introspected 
prejudices were associated with automatic racial attitudes across conditions in which 
introspection occurred. These analyses will reveal the degree to which individuals were 
aware of and willing to report their automatic racial biases across experimental 
conditions. I then conduct analyses to examine the degree to which automatically-
activated racial attitudes, Concern, and experimental conditions interact to predict overall 
pro-Black trait ratings, followed by looking at pro-Black trait ratings toward groups and 
individuals separately. I next report on how automatically-activated racial attitudes, 
Concern, and experimental conditions interact to predict self-reported prejudice (i.e., the 
composite of subtle prejudice, blatant prejudice, anti-Black attitudes, and symbolic 
racism). I then examine the interaction of automatically-activated racial attitudes, 
Restraint, and experimental conditions in predicting overall pro-Black trait ratings, pro-
Black individual and group trait ratings separately, and self-reported prejudice.  
Admission of racial biases. One primary question of the current work is whether 
individuals have introspective access as to their racial biases and the conditions under 
which they are willing to report them. Indeed, high Concern individuals fail to correct for 
their prejudices in previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014), which is consistent with a 
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lack of introspective access to their own prejudices, and/or a willingness to report them. 
Thus, I first examined the degree to which participant automatic attitude estimates were 
correlated with research assistant perceptions of participant admittance of bias (i.e., 
Introspected Prejudice), as indicated by coding of participant introspection responses.  
I conducted a hierarchical regression utilizing dummy coded predictors with the 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition coded as the reference group and 
the Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second and Introspection Only conditions coded 
as predictor variables. Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes and Concern were also 
entered as predictor variables and Introspected Prejudice was entered as the dependent 
variable. The proper two- and three-way interactions of these terms were entered as well. 
The regression uncovered that Automatically-activated racial attitudes predicted 
Introspected Prejudice in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition (r = 
.26, p < .09), but not the Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition (r = -.16, 
p = .34), t (115) = -1.97, p = .05, or Introspection Only condition (r = -.02, p = .90), t 
(121) = -1.15, p = .25. Additionally, the difference in the correlation between 
automatically-activated attitudes and introspected prejudice among those in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition (relative to Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second or Introspection Only conditions) did not vary as a function of 
Concern (p’s > .55). These findings suggest that individuals do have some degree of 
accurate introspective access as to their own prejudices and are willing to admit them, at 
least, as hypothesized, in contexts in which self-threat may be reduced by a self-
affirmation.  
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The aforementioned analyses provide some initial evidence that individuals may 
have access as to their own prejudices and a willingness to express them in contexts when 
self-threat is first reduced by a self-affirmation. Interestingly, the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition uniquely allowed for accurate introspective access 
relative to the Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition. Thus, the 
Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second and Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second conditions were treated as separate conditions in all subsequent experimental 
analyses (as opposed to collapsing across conditions). Based on these initial findings that 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition participants have more accurate 
access as to their automatic racial attitudes relative to other experimental conditions, I 
next examined whether individuals in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second 
condition were likely to correct for their prejudices in their reported impressions of Black 
and White targets, especially as hypothesized when Concern and automatically-activated 
racial prejudices were high.  
Prejudice correction on trait ratings. Dummy coding was utilized to compare 
each of the five experimental conditions with regard to the hypothesized Concern x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in predicting pro-Black trait ratings 
to determine whether self-affirmation, introspection, or a combination of both elements 
may be most efficacious at leading to prejudice correction among egalitarian-oriented 
individuals. To test primary hypotheses, hierarchical regressions with overall pro-Black 
trait ratings entered as the dependent variable were conducted. In the first regression, the 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition was coded as the reference group. 
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In the second, third, and fourth regressions, the Control, Introspection Only, and Self-
Affirmation Only conditions were coded as the reference groups, respectively. In each 
regression, the four predictor variables, as well as Concern and automatically-activated 
racial attitudes were entered in Step 1. Concern and automatically-activated attitudes 
were centered prior to forming the product terms of the interaction entered in this and all 
subsequently reported regressions to reduce multicollinearity among the predictors 
(Aiken & West, 1991). In Step 2, the two-way interactions of Concern with each of the 
four predictor variables, as well as automatically-activated racial attitudes with each of 
the four predictor variables were entered within each regression. The Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes x Concern interaction was also entered in Step 2 within each 
regression. In Step 3, the three-way interactions of each of the four predictor variables 
with Concern and automatically-activated racial attitudes were entered within each 
regression.  
 The regressions revealed significant Predictor main effects (t’s > | 2.13 |, p’s < 
.04), such that those in the Introspection Only condition (M = .13, SD = .25) expressed 
lower overall pro-Black trait ratings than participants in in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition (M = .27, SD = .26), Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second condition, (M = .32, SD = .32), Self-Affirmation Only condition (M 
= .26, SD = .28), or Control condition (M = .26, SD = .39). No other main effects 
emerged (all p’s > .35). However, a Predictor x Concern interaction emerged, t (195) = -
2.13, p = .03. The nature of the interaction was such that among those in the Control 
condition, Concern was positively, but not significantly correlated with overall pro-Black 
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trait judgments, r (42) = .26, p < .10. This finding is congruent with previous research 
(Zabel & Olson, 2014). However, among those in the Introspection Only condition, 
Concern was negatively, but not significantly correlated with overall pro-Black trait 
ratings, r (43) = -.20, p = .20. No other two-way interactions emerged significantly (all 
p’s > .13).  
However, several three-way interactions emerged significantly. Specifically, as 
expected, the Predictor (Control vs. Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes x Concern, t (191) = -2.12, p = .04, as well as 
the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second) x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes x Concern 
interaction, t (191) = -2.29, p = .02, emerged significantly. Furthermore, a marginally 
significant Predictor (Self-Affirmation Only vs. Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second) x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes x Concern interaction emerged, t 
(191) = -1.66, p < .10. No other three-way interactions emerged (all p’s > .19).  
The nature of these interactions was such that the Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes x Concern interaction emerged significantly in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition (see Figure 1), t (41) = 2.27, p = .03, but not in the 
Control (see Figure 2), t (38) = -.87, p = .39, Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second 
(see Figure 3), t (33) = -1.60, p = .12, or Self-Affirmation Only condition, t (40) = -.48, p 
= .64. Simple slope analyses indicated that among participants in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition with more pro-White automatically-activated 
attitudes (+1 SD), Concern was expectedly positively associated with overall pro-Black 
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trait ratings, t (41) = 2.25, p = .03. Among those with more pro-Black automatically-
activated attitudes (-1 SD), Concern was not correlated with overall pro-Black trait 
ratings, t (41) = -.79, p = .43. Thus, as expected, as pro-White automatic attitudes 
increased, Concern motivation led to corrections for automatic-prejudice among those 
who were self-affirmed first and then introspected on their racial biases. Moreover, this 
pattern of correction for automatic prejudice among high Concern participants was 
different from experimental conditions in which no self-affirmation or introspection 
occurred, or when self-affirmation followed racial bias introspection. This is congruent 
with my reasoning that self-affirmation may reduce the self-threat to introspecting about 
one’s own racial biases, which may in turn facilitate deeper and more accurate racial 
attitude introspection and prejudice correction effects among high Concern individuals.  
Results thus far indicate that self-affirmation and racial bias introspection are 
necessary to lead to corrections for automatic prejudice in the form of overall pro-Black 
trait ratings toward among high egalitarian-oriented (Concern) individuals. However, 
previous research suggests that given its underlying tenets, Concern may be especially 
likely to be activated and hence influential in prejudice correction in social judgments 
toward group (relative to individual) targets (Olson & Fazio, 2009). Thus, I next 
examined whether the expected pattern of automatic prejudice correction among high 
Concern individuals previously uncovered in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition was more apparent toward group, relative to individual targets.  
To do so, I conducted a series of four hierarchical regressions in the same manner 
as that of the previously reported regressions. The only difference was that pro-Black 
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group trait ratings were entered as the dependent variable. The regressions yielded a main 
effect, t (183) = 2.04, p = .04, such that participants in the Introspection Only condition 
(M = .32, SD = .35) demonstrated lower pro-Black group trait ratings than those in the 
Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition (M = .51, SD = .33). No other main 
effects emerged significantly across regressions (all p’s > .12). Moreover, no two-way 
interactions between study variables emerged (all p’s > .10). However, the previously 
elaborated three-way interactions emerged and mirrored results from the regression with 
overall pro-Black trait ratings entered as the dependent varaible. Specifically, the 
Predictor (Control vs. Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes x Concern interaction emerged significantly, t (170) = -2.07, p 
= .04, as did the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes x 
Concern interaction, t (170) = -2.25, p = .03.  
The nature of these interactions mirrored the previously elaborated results, with 
the Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction emerging in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition, t (41) = 2.19, p = .03. Simple slope 
analyses indicated that among participants in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition with more pro-White automatically-activated attitudes (+1 SD), 
Concern was marginally positively associated with pro-Black group trait ratings, t (41) = 
1.90, p = .06. Among those with more pro-Black automatically-activated attitudes (-1 
SD) in this condition, Concern was not associated with pro-Black group trait ratings, t 
(41) = -1.02, p = .31. Thus, as expected, as automatically-prejudiced attitudes increased, 
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Concern led to corrections for automatic-prejudice in the form of pro-Black group trait 
ratings among those who were self-affirmed first and then introspected on their racial 
biases. The Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction also emerged 
marginally significantly in the Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition, t 
(33) = -1.78, p = .08. Simple slope analyses indicated that among participants with pro-
White (+1 SD) automatically-activated racial attitudes in the Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second condition, Concern negatively, albeit not significantly, was 
correlated with pro-Black group trait ratings, t (33) = -1.30, p = .20. Among participants 
with more pro-Black (-1 SD) automatically-activated racial attitudes (-1 SD) in this 
condition, Concern was not associated with pro-Black group trait ratings, t (33) = 1.45, p 
= .16.  
I next examined whether this pattern of prejudice correction among high Concern 
participants was also present toward individual targets by conducting a series of four 
hierarchical regressions using the same hierarchical regression approach as previously 
elaborated. In each regression, pro-Black individual trait ratings were entered as the 
dependent variable. These regressions revealed no statistically significant main effects 
(all p’s > .15) or two-way interactions (all p’s > .13). Interestingly, no three-way 
interactions emerged significantly (all p’s > .11), although patterns were similar in nature 
to results reported with pro-Black overall trait ratings entered as the dependent variable. 
Thus, the pattern of prejudice correction among high Concern participants in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition relative to other experimental 
conditions seems to be especially salient in group target construal contexts.  
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These results clearly indicate that a self-affirmation, followed by introspection of 
racial biases, leads to social judgment corrections for automatic prejudice among 
egalitarian-oriented Whites. Moreover, order of these tasks matters; racial introspection 
followed by a self-affirmation is not sufficient to producing corrections for automatic 
prejudices among high Concern individuals, and may even lead to more pro-White 
judgments or behaviors. Furthermore, congruent with previous research (Olson & Fazio, 
2009), Concern appears to be especially applicable to prejudice correction in group target 
construal contexts. I next examined potential converging evidence for prejudice 
correction among high Concern individuals in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition regarding self-reported measures of prejudice.  
Prejudice correction regarding explicit attitude judgments. Self-report 
measures of subtle prejudice, blatant prejudice, anti-Black attitudes, and symbolic racism 
were positively correlated (all r’s > .42, all p’s < .001, Mr = .58). As such, z scores of 
these measures were computed. The mean of these z scores was used as a composite 
measure of self-reported prejudice in subsequent primary analyses. These composite self-
reported prejudice scores ranged from -2.05 to 2.18. To further explore the nature of 
prejudice correction effects, regressions with the prejudice composite measure entered as 
the dependent variable were conducted. Specifically, I conducted a series of four 
hierarchical regressions in a similar manner to that of the previously reported regressions. 
In each regression, prejudice composite scores were entered as the dependent variable.  
Regressions indicated a main effect of Concern, t (204) = -5.77, p < .001, such 
that Concern was negatively predictive of the self-reported prejudice composite. No other 
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main effects emerged (all p’s > .15). However, the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second vs. Control) x Concern interaction, t (195) = 1.83, p = .07, Predictor 
(Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Introspection Only) interaction, t (195) = 
1.95, p = .05, and Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-
Affirmation Only) x Concern interaction, t (195) = 1.90, p = .06, each emerged. The 
nature of these interactions was that Concern was negatively associated with self-reported 
prejudice among Introspection Only (r = -.47, p < .01), Control (r = -.46, p < .01), and 
Self-Affirmation Only (r = -.46, p < .01) condition participants, whereas it was not 
among Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition participants (r = -.07, p = 
.69).   
Additionally, the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. 
Introspection Only) x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes, t (185) = 1.83, p = .07, 
as well as Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-Affirmation 
Only) x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction, t (195) = 1.70, p = .09, 
each emerged marginally significantly. The nature of these interactions was that 
automatically-activated racial attitudes were positively correlated with self-reported 
prejudice among Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition participants (r = 
.31, p = .06), but not among participants in the Introspection Only (r = -.11, p = .48) or 
Self-Affirmation Only condition (r = -.02, p = .88). No other two-way interactions 
emerged significantly (all p’s > .11).  
The Predictor (Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second vs. Introspection 
First/Self-Affirmation Second) x Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes, t 
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(191) = 1.88, p = .06, as well as the Predictor (Self-Affirmation Fist/Introspection Second 
vs. Self-Affirmation Only) x Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes 
interaction, t (191) = 1.82, p = .07, each emerged marginally significantly. No other 
three-way interactions emerged significantly (all p’s > .11). The Concern x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction trended toward significance in 
predicting self-reported prejudice in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second 
condition, t (41) = -1.56, p = .13. Simple slope analyses indicated that among individuals 
with pro-White automatically-activated attitudes (+1 SD) in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition, Concern was as expected negatively predictive of 
self-reported prejudice composite scores, t (41) = -2.42, p = .02. In comparison, among 
individuals with pro-Black (-1 SD) automatically-activated attitudes in this condition, 
Concern was not predictive of self-reported prejudice, t (41) = -.28, p = .78.  
The Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction trended 
toward significance in predicting self-reported prejudice in the Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second, t (33) = 1.49, p = .15. Simple slope analyses also indicated that 
among individuals with pro-White automatically-activated attitudes (+1 SD) in the 
Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition, Concern was positively associated 
with self-reported prejudice, albeit not significantly, t (33) = .77, p = .45. In comparison, 
among individuals with pro-Black automatically-activated attitudes (-1 SD) in this 
condition, Concern was negatively, albeit not significantly associated with self-reported 
prejudice, t (33) = -1.41, p = .17. The Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
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Attitudes interaction did not emerge significantly in the Self-Affirmation Only condition, 
t (40) = .84, p = .41. 
These findings indicate that self-affirmation followed by racial attitude 
introspection appears to prompt individuals with pro-White automatically-activated racial 
attitudes to reduce self-reported prejudice as Concern motivation increases. These results 
are congruent with the direct test of primary hypotheses reported earlier, in which 
individuals with pro-White automatically-activated attitudes corrected for their automatic 
prejudices in the form of pro-Black trait ratings as Concern Motivation increased in the 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition. Results thus far indicate that self-
affirmation must precede racial prejudice introspection in order for prejudice correction 
among high Concern individuals to be facilitated. As a final note, prejudice correction 
effects among high Concern individuals in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition do not appear to be strictly limited toward individual or group targets in 
the social perception process, but rather are applicable to social perception, judgments, 
and attitudes more broadly. 
Role of restraint motivation in trait judgment prejudice correction. Given 
that Concern motivation is more intrinsically-based and tied to self-image than Restraint 
motivation, I expected Restraint to similarly facilitate prejudice correction across all 
experimental conditions, including the Control condition. Indeed, the Control condition 
provides an opportunity for a conceptual replication of my previous research (Zabel & 
Olson, 2014) in which high Restraint individuals correct for their prejudices, especially in 
individual target construal situations. However, an examination of the Restraint x 
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Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction among participants in the Control 
condition of the current study with overall pro-Black ratings entered as the dependent 
variable indicated no statistically significant main effects (all p’s > .22) or the expected 
interaction, t (38) = -.15, p = .88. Furthermore, the Restraint x Automatically-Activated 
Racial Attitudes interaction did not emerge regarding pro-Black individual (p = .75) or 
group (p = .95) trait ratings. While at first blush these results indicate a failure to 
replicate, the Control condition in the current study was uniquely different from my 
previous work in that in the current work, participants were informed that racial biases 
are pervasive across society prior to providing trait ratings to maintain consistency across 
all conditions. Perhaps this prompt diminished activation of their conflict avoidance 
motive (i.e., Restraint), either by overactivating Concern motivation or providing external 
justification that reduced the activation of Restraint.  
Speculation aside, I next sat out to verify that the interaction of Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes and motivation (i.e., Concern) to control prejudiced reactions 
among individuals in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition was a 
uniquely Concern (and not Restraint) facilitated effect. The same hierarchical approach 
using four regressions employed in previous analyses was utilized regarding the variables 
of Restraint, automatically-activated racial attitudes, and predictor variables. In each 
regression, overall pro-Black trait ratings were entered as the dependent variable. No 
Restraint main effect, t (204) = -.09, p = .93, or Restraint x Automatically-Activated 
Racial Attitude, t (195) = -1.22, p = .22, emerged. However, the Predictor (Introspection 
First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Control) x Restraint interaction emerged, t (195) = 
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2.47, p = .01. The nature of the interaction was such that among those in the Introspection 
First/Self-Affirmation Second condition, Restraint was marginally positively associated 
with overall pro-Black trait ratings (r = .32, p = .06), whereas this correlation was 
negative but not statistically significant among Control condition participants (r = -.17, p 
= .29). No other two-way (all p’s > .14) or three-way (all p’s > .50) interactions emerged 
significantly.  
Results indicate that Restraint does not interact with automatically-activated racial 
attitudes in predicting overall pro-Black trait ratings. More importantly regarding the 
current study’s purposes, results thus far indicate that as expected, Restraint does not 
differentially facilitate prejudice correction effects between any of the experimental 
conditions. However, my previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014) indicates that 
Restraint is activated more strongly and hence more applicable to prejudice correction in 
individual target construal contexts. Thus, I next examined the degree to which Restraint 
interacted with automatically-activated racial attitudes to predict pro-Black individual 
target ratings across and between experimental conditions. To do so, and as previously 
elaborated, I conducted four hierarchical regressions with pro-Black individual trait 
ratings entered as the dependent variable.   
No Restraint main effect, t (204) = .93, p = .35, or Restraint x Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes interaction emerged, t (195) = -1.00, p = .32. However, the 
Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Control) x Restraint interaction 
emerged, t (195) = 3.31, p = .01, as did the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation 
Second vs. Introspection Only) x Restraint interaction (albeit marginally), t (195) = 1.82, 
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p = .07, the Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-Affirmation 
Only) x Restraint interaction (albeit marginally), t (195) = 1.76, p = .08, and the Restraint 
x Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second) interaction, t (195) = 2.00, p < .05. The nature of these 
interactions was such that Restraint was positively associated with pro-Black individual 
trait ratings among Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition participants (r 
= .44, p < .01), but not among participants in the Control condition (r = -.16, p = .30), 
Introspection Only condition (r = .10, p = .52), Self-Affirmation Only condition (r = .10, 
p = .52, or Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition (r = .01, p = .92). No 
other previously unreported two-way (all p’s > .12) or three-way (all p’s > .75) 
interactions emerged significantly. 
I also examined how Restraint, automatically-activated racial attitudes, and 
experimental conditions interacted to predict pro-Black group trait ratings using the 
previously elaborated hierarchical regression strategy. These regressions yielded no 
Restraint main effects, t (183) = -.78, p = .44, or Restraint x Automatically-Activated 
Racial Attitudes interaction, t (174) = -.78, p = .44. Furthermore, no two-way (all p’s > 
.25) or three-way (all p’s > .46) interactions emerged significantly. Together, these 
regression reveal no differences in how Restraint interacts with automatically-activated 
racial attitudes to predict pro-Black trait ratings between experimental conditions. Thus, 
the efficacy of self-affirmation followed by racial prejudice introspection in leading to 
prejudice correction appears to be specific to high Concern (and not Restraint) 
individuals. This pattern of findings is congruent with my theoretical reasoning regarding 
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the efficacy of self-affirmation in reducing the threat of racial attitude introspection to the 
self among egalitarian-oriented individuals, as well as the underlying tenets of Concern 
and Restraint motives.   
Role of restraint motivation in self-reported racial attitude prejudice 
correction. To further inspect the potential nature of Restraint in prejudice correction 
effects, I initially examined the role of Restraint in leading to self-reported prejudice 
correction effects among individuals in the Control condition. However, an examination 
of the Restraint x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction among 
participants in the Control condition with the self-reported prejudice composite entered as 
the dependent variable indicated no statistically significant main effects (all p’s > .80) or 
the expected interaction, t (38) = -.09, p = .93. Thus, as previously elaborated, these 
results indicate a failure to replicate previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014), although I 
suspect this may be due to slight differences in the methodology between the current 
study and this past research.  
I next conducted four separate regressions, each with the self-reported composite 
prejudice measure entered as the dependent variable. In each regression, the predictor 
variables, Restraint, and automatically-activated racial attitudes, as well as the proper 
two-way and three-way interactions of these terms were entered. Given Restraint’s 
underlying tenets, I did not expect it to interact with automatic racial attitudes 
differentially between experimental conditions. Results indicated that neither the 
Restraint main effect, t (204) = -.12, p = .91, or Restraint x Automatically-Activated 
Racial Attitudes interaction, t (195) = -.26, p = .80, emerged significantly. However, the 
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Predictor (Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second vs. Introspection Only) x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction emerged significantly, t (195) = -
1.94, p = .05. For participants in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second 
condition, as automatically-activated racial attitudes became more pro-White, self-
reported prejudice levels also tended to increase (r = .28, p = .06). This finding is 
congruent with previously-reported findings that individuals may have greater access to 
their automatic prejudices under conditions of self-affirmation followed by racial 
attitudes introspection. In comparison, among Introspection Only condition participants, 
as automatically-activated racial attitudes became pro-White, self-reported prejudice 
levels tended to decrease, albeit not significantly (r = -.11, p = .48). No other two-way 
(all p’s > .12) or three-way (all p’s > .45) interactions emerged significantly. Thus, 
correction of automatic prejudice among highly motivated individuals in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition relative to the Control condition 
appears to be, as expected, a Concern-fueled effect.  
Supplementary Analyses 
Trait rating response latencies. If participants with pro-White automatically-
activated attitudes took longer to make trait ratings toward critical targets as Concern 
motivation increased in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition but not 
the Control (Control) condition, it would provide converging evidence for more 
deliberative processes (Olson & Fazio, 2009) important to automatic prejudice correction. 
To assess this possibility, I conducted a hierarchical regression in which the mean of 
critical overall trait rating trial response latencies was entered as the dependent variable. 
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The Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition was dummy coded as the 
reference group, with corresponding predictor variables entered, as well as the necessary 
two- and three-way interactions of variables.  
The regression yielded a marginally significant Predictor (Introspection First/ 
Introspection Second) main effect, t (204) = 1.92, p = .06, such that those in the 
Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second condition (M = 2,148.33, SD = 484.12) took 
longer than those in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition (M = 
1,948.37, SD = 512.24). No other statistically significant main effects (all p’s > .12) or 
two-way interactions (all p’s > .19) emerged. However, the expected three-way Predictor 
(Control vs. Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x Concern x Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes interaction emerged, t (191) = -3.90, p < .001.  
The nature of this interaction was such that among those in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition, the Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes interaction emerged significantly (see Figure 4), t (41) = 2.57, p = .01. Simple 
slope analyses indicated that among those in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition with pro-White automatically-activated racial attitudes (+1 SD), 
Concern was expectedly positively associated with overall critical trial trait rating 
response latencies, albeit not significantly t (41) = 1.35, p = .19. However, among those 
with pro-Black automatically-activated racial attitudes (-1 SD) in this condition, Concern 
was negatively predictive of overall critical trial trait rating response latencies, t (41) = -
2.03, p < .05. In the Control condition, the Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes interaction also emerged significantly, but with a different pattern (see Figure 
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5), t (38) = -2.92, p < .01. Simple slope analyses indicated that among participants in the 
Control condition with pro-White automatically-activated racial attitudes (+1 SD), 
Concern was negatively predictive of overall critical trial trait rating response latencies, t 
(38) = -3.39, p < .01. However, among participants with pro-Black automatically-
activated racial attitudes (+1 SD) in the Control condition, Concern was not predictive of 
overall critical trial trait rating response latencies, t (38) = -.43, p =.67. The Predictor 
(Self-Affirmation Only vs. Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x Concern x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction also emerged significantly, t (191) = 
-2.52, p = .01. The nature of this interaction was elaborated above regarding Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition participants. The Concern x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction did not emerge significantly among 
Self-Affirmation Only condition participants, t (40) = -1.12, p = .27 (see Figure 6).  
The finding that high Concern individuals with pro-White automatic attitudes in 
the Control condition took significantly less time to make trait judgments is congruent 
with the previously elaborated “like everyone” heuristic and lack of prejudice correction 
among high Concern individuals with pro-White automatic attitudes demonstrated in 
previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014). Furthermore, the finding that high Concern 
individuals with pro-White automatic attitudes in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition took more time to make trait judgments is congruent with my reasoning 
that self-affirmation reduces the self-threat of introspection, which in turn leads to 
reasonably accurate introspection and anticipated prejudice correction effects via more 
deliberative processing. Indeed, Control condition participants high in Concern may fail 
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to introspect on their racial prejudices to avoid a self-threat, which in turn leads them to 
employ the “like everyone” heuristic congruent with their egalitarian focus but not to 
correct for their automatic racial prejudices. The aforementioned response latency 
findings are congruent with this reasoning.  
 I next conducted two regressions to examine whether the Concern x 
Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interactions in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second and Control conditions were driven by response latencies 
toward critical Black targets, critical White targets, or both. In each regression, response 
latencies regarding overall trait rating trials toward all critical Black targets and all 
critical White targets were entered as the dependent variable, respectively. In both 
regressions, the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition was coded as the 
reference group. Variables were entered in the regressions in the same manner as 
elaborated on previously.   
 The first yielded the same previously reported Predictor (Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second vs. Control) x Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes interaction, t (191) = -3.63, p < .001, and Predictor (Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second vs. Self-Affirmation Only) x Concern x Automatically-
Activated Racial Attitudes interaction, t (191) = -2.59, p = .01. The nature of these 
interactions mirrored that with the overall response latencies toward critical targets 
entered as the dependent variable. Specifically, among Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second participants with pro-White (+1 SD) automatically-activated 
racial attitudes, Concern was positively associated with response latencies toward Black 
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targets, whereas among those in the Control condition, Concern was negatively 
associated with response latencies toward Black targets. These findings suggest that the 
same patterns elaborated on earlier regarding the “like everyone” heuristic in the Control 
(control) condition and more deliberative prejudice correction in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition among high Concern individuals are supported by 
participants’ response latencies toward Black critical targets. Further follow-up analyses 
indicated that the Predictor x (Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second vs. Control) x 
Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction emerged both toward 
Black group and individual targets (p’s < .01). 
The second regression yielded the same Predictor (Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second vs. Control) x Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes interaction reported previously, t (191) = -4.02, p < .001, as well as the 
Predictor (Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second vs. Self-Affirmation Only) x 
Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction, t (191) = -2.37, p = .02. 
The nature of these interactions mirrored those elaborated on earlier. Specifically, among 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition participants with pro-White (+1 
SD) automatically-activated racial attitudes, Concern was positively associated with 
response latencies toward White targets, albeit not significantly, t (41) = 1.46, p = .15, 
whereas among Control condition with pro-White (+1 SD) automatically-activated racial 
attitudes, Concern was negatively predictive of response latencies toward White targets, t 
(38) = -3.31, p < .01. Follow-up analyses indicated that the Predictor x (Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second vs. Control) x Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated 
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Racial Attitudes interaction emerged both toward White group and individual targets (p’s 
< .01).  
These findings provide response latency support for the “like everyone” heuristic 
and failure to correct for automatic prejudices among high Concern individuals in 
previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014) and suggest that this heuristic influences 
judgments both toward Black and White targets among high Concern individuals. 
Furthermore, the response latencies provide support for more deliberative social 
judgment in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition, which converges 
with the prejudice correction trait rating effects demonstrated among individuals with 
pro-White automatically-activated racial attitudes in the Self-Affirmation 













Chapter 5: Discussion 
Automatic prejudices are pervasive. Thus, it is important to understand the 
processes by which automatic prejudices can be corrected for in social judgments and 
behaviors, which in turn may hold direct implications for improving intergroup relations 
and outcomes for lower status group members. Previous research (Fazio, 1990; Fiske et 
al., 1999) indicates that motivation and opportunity (i.e., time, attentional resources) are 
essential to enabling automatic prejudice correction. However, even when both 
motivation and opportunity exist, automatic prejudice correction may not occur (Zabel & 
Olson, 2014). This previous research indicates that high egalitarian-oriented (Concern) 
Whites fail to correct for their automatically-activated racial attitudes in social 
perception.  
Two possibilities for this tendency were raised and tested in this work. The first 
possibility was that egalitarian-oriented individuals may lack introspective access to their 
automatic racial attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; but see Fazio & Olson, 2003), 
rendering automatic prejudice correction impossible. However, previous research 
(Phillips & Olson, 2014), as well as the finding in the current study that automatically-
activated racial attitudes were positively correlated with the degree to which participants 
admitted bias in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition contradicts 
this possibility. Thus, clearly individuals do have the capacity to accurately introspect on 
their automatic racial attitudes under the right conditions (i.e., self-affirmation followed 
by racial attitude introspection).  
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This finding suggests that egalitarian-oriented individuals in previous work (e.g., 
Zabel & Olson, 2014) in which no self-affirmation or racial attitude introspection 
occurred may have failed to correct for their automatic prejudices due to lacking 
awareness of their automatic racial attitudes, but not the ability to introspect on their 
racial attitudes. The question then becomes: Why do egalitarian-oriented individuals fail 
to reflect on and subsequently correct for their automatic prejudices? Egalitarian-oriented 
(high Concern) individuals have a non-prejudiced self-image. Thus, the prospect of 
introspecting on their racial prejudices may be a threat to their self-image, a threat that 
previous research would suggest that egalitarian-oriented individuals are motivated to 
avoid (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Consistent with a motivational perspective and 
prominent theoretical approaches (e.g., Aversive Racism Theory; Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986), egalitarian-oriented Whites may fail to introspect and subsequently correct for 
their automatic prejudices in judgments in behavior under normal circumstances in order 
to avoid a threat to their egalitarian self-image. Given its success in facilitating attention 
to otherwise self-threatening information, I proposed that self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) 
would enhance the likelihood that egalitarian-oriented Whites reflected accurately on 
their automatic racial biases. Furthermore, I expected that self-affirmation followed by 
racial attitude introspection would prompt automatic prejudice correction among 
egalitarian-oriented Whites in a manner congruent with prominent bias correction 
theories (Wegener & Petty, 1997) and social psychological research findings (Olson & 
Fazio, 2004; 2014).  
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Congruent with this reasoning, high Concern individuals in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition corrected for their automatic prejudices in the form 
of trait judgments, whereas those in the Control condition did not. These findings are 
substantiated by response latency data indicating that individuals with pro-White 
automatic attitudes took longer in trait rating judgments toward critical targets as Concern 
increased when they self-affirmed and then introspected. These findings add convergent 
validity for automatic prejudice correction in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition by indicating that judgments made in this context were made more 
deliberately as individuals corrected for their prejudices. As elaborated earlier, I suspect 
that self-affirmation reduces the potential self-threat of introspecting about one’s own 
racial biases among egalitarian-oriented Whites, leading to more accurate and deep 
introspection of one’s biases, and subsequently, correction for automatic prejudice. 
 In the absence of the specific combination of self-affirmation followed by racial 
attitude introspection, the default strategy among egalitarian-oriented Whites appears to 
be to “like everyone” using more automatic, heuristic processes (Zabel & Olson, 2014). 
Replicating previous research, Concern was positively correlated with trait ratings toward 
all critical targets among participants in the Control condition. As in my previous 
research (Zabel & Olson, 2014), automatic attitudes did not interact with Concern in 
predicting pro-Black trait judgments among participants in the Control condition. This 
finding indicates that the norm is for egalitarian-oriented individuals to fail to account for 
the influence of their automatically-activated attitudes in social perception, which is 
congruent with my perspective that egalitarian-oriented individuals fail to correct for 
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their automatic prejudices due to the self-threat encapsulated in introspecting on such 
prejudices.  
These findings are substantiated by response latency data indicating that high 
Concern participants made quicker trait judgments toward overall critical targets in the 
Control condition as their automatic attitudes became more pro-White. These reduced 
response latencies are consistent with the perspective that egalitarian-oriented Whites 
develop a “like everyone” heuristic to avoid a discrepancy between their automatic 
prejudice and egalitarian self-image, and that this may be especially true among those 
with pro-White automatic attitudes whose self-image is most threatened by potentially 
prejudice-conveying contexts. It is important to note that analyses indicated no 
interaction of Concern and automatically-activated racial attitudes in predicting overall 
trait ratings toward all critical targets. Based on the response latency data, one might 
expect individuals with pro-White automatically-activated attitudes to be especially likely 
to provide positive trait ratings as Concern increased based on heuristic use. Why this 
inconsistency exists is unclear. However, I have consistently uncovered no interaction of 
automatic racial attitudes with Concern in predicting pro-Black and overall trait ratings in 
this and previous research (Zabel & Olson, 2014). Thus, the anomaly or less substantiated 
finding that warrants verification and future examination may be that individuals with 
pro-White attitudes take a shorter amount of time to make judgments as Concern 
increases.    
Interestingly, the automatic prejudice correction pattern among egalitarian-
oriented individuals that occurred among Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second 
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condition participants did not emerge among participants in the Introspection First/Self-
Affirmation Second condition. In contrast, a marginally significant opposite pattern 
emerged, such that self-affirmation preceded by racial prejudice introspection 
paradoxically led to reduced Pro-Black trait ratings among high Concern individuals with 
pro-White automatic attitudes. Although unexpected, I suspect this may due to 
psychological defensiveness and reactance (Brehm, 1966). Specifically, egalitarian-
oriented individuals may be especially likely to respond with disdain and interpret 
instructions to introspect as accusatory of their own racial prejudices. These individuals 
may be especially likely to perceive they are being forced to confront their own 
prejudices outside of their own terms and also when there is no need to do so based on 
their egalitarian values. Following introspection (which is unlikely to lead to accurate 
self-reflection based on the data herein), self-affirmations may release participants from 
negative ruminative thoughts (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) 
regarding being forced to introspect on their racial prejudices. In turn, this may create a 
backlash effect (Plant et al., 2010) of reactance in which high Concern individuals 
actually favor White relative to Black targets.  
No differences in response latencies among egalitarian-oriented individuals with 
pro-White automatically-activated attitudes emerged between participants in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second and Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second 
conditions. These findings indicate that although the combination of racial prejudice 
introspection and self-affirmation leads to similar amounts of deliberation in social 
judgments, the order of these processes is critically important to facilitating automatic 
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prejudice correction effects. As these results demonstrate, self-affirmation must precede 
racial prejudice introspection to facilitate prejudice correction effects among high 
Concern individuals.  
The correction for automatic prejudice appears to be especially applicable among 
high Concern (relative to Restraint) individuals in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition toward group targets. This is consistent with 
previous research indicating that Concern appears to stem from an interest in redressing 
historical inequalities (Fazio & Olson, 2014), as well as egalitarianism (Fazio & Hilden, 
2001), rendering it more applicable and active in impression formation contexts in which 
targets are construed at the group level (Zabel & Olson, 2014). However, Concern also 
trended toward facilitating automatic prejudice toward individual targets among those in 
the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition. This is also consistent with 
previous research demonstrating how remarkably flexible construal of social targets can 
be depending on perceiver motives (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). In sum, our findings are 
congruent with previous research indicating that perceiver motives influence construal 
and social perception processes in the impression context (Kunda & Thagard, 1996), as 
well as recent research indicating that activation and application of impression-relevant 
motives (i.e., Concern) is influenced by how a target is construed (Zabel & Olson, 2014).  
 It is important to note that the prejudice correction effects facilitated by 
motivation among individuals in the Self Affirmation First/Introspection Second 
condition appear to be unique to Concern (and not Restraint) motivation. Indeed, this is 
consistent with Concern being more intrinsically-based and tied to one’s self-image than 
72  
Restraint, which is more extrinsically-based and interpersonally-activated. Because the 
self-affirmation manipulation was designed to reduce the self-image threat of racial 
attitude introspection, I did not expect it to have an influence in producing Restraint-
facilitated prejudice correction effects. 
 Previous research indicates that high Restraint individuals correct for their 
prejudices when construing targets at the individual level in the absence of racial attitude 
introspection and self-affirmation (Zabel & Olson, 2014). However, the current study 
found no interaction of Restraint and automatically-activated attitudes in predicting pro-
Black trait judgments across conditions. Although this is a failure to replicate, I expect it 
may be due to procedural differences between studies. Specifically, in the current 
research, all participants were informed that automatic prejudices are pervasive in 
contemporary American society, even if we as individuals are not aware of our own 
biases. This prompt may have provided high Restraint individuals sufficient extrinsic 
justification to not correct for their automatic prejudices (i.e., everyone is prejudiced), 
leading to this failure to replicate previous findings. Another possibility is that the prompt 
in the current study highlighted race as a social category, facilitated group level target 
construal, and in turn activated Concern (relative to Restraint) motivation more strongly 
(Zabel & Olson, 2014), reducing the influence of Restraint in producing prejudice 
correction effects in the Control condition.  
Automatic prejudice correction effects in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition are generally consistent with the Moderated Consistency Model 
(Hofmann et al., 2005), in which awareness teamed with adjustment (motivation) is 
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posited to reduce implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. In previous examinations 
(Gschwendner et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2005) of the Moderated Consistency Model, 
awareness has been primarily operationalized as private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et 
al., 1975). However my experimental focus on racial attitude introspection expands 
understanding of the role of awareness in at least two ways. First, it examines whether the 
more conscious action of racial attitude introspection also facilitates adjustment. 
Furthermore, it provides a more domain specific operationalization of racial attitude 
awareness, compared to a more generalized, dispositional operationalization of 
awareness. Indeed, I suspect that generalized self-awareness is distinct from the more 
conscious and domain specific process of racial attitude introspection. If so, this may 
provide support for the relative advantage of more nuanced and domain specific 
operationalizations of awareness in future research examining the roles of awareness and 
motivation in implicit-explicit consistency.  
To assess this possibility in the current research, I examined the degree to which 
private self-consciousness influenced the extent to which individuals expressed accurate 
awareness of their automatic racial attitudes. I regressed participants’ introspected 
prejudice on dummy coded predictor variables (Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second coded as the reference group), automatically-activated racial attitudes, and private 
self-consciousness, as well as the appropriate two- and three-way interactions of these 
terms. Importantly, the Private Self-Consciousness x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes x Predictor interaction did not emerge, t (115) = -.06, p = .95. Furthermore, 
private self-consciousness was not correlated with either automatic racial attitudes (r = -
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.10, p = .51) or introspected prejudice (r = -.03, p = .85) in the Self-Affirmation 
First/Introspection Second condition or any of the other experimental conditions (all r’s < 
| .23 |, all p’s > .14, Mr = .12). Although private self-consciousness has often been used as 
a dispositional measure of awareness in previous research (Gschwendner et al., 2006; 
Hofmann et al., 2005), these findings suggest that it plays no role in the degree to which 
individuals accurately report their own racial biases, and that private self-consciousness 
may be tapping a more generalized construct distinct from racial attitude awareness 
specifically. Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the current results are congruent 
with work employing private self-consciousness as an awareness measure, as well as the 
Moderated Consistency Model (Gschwendner et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2005). 
However, future research should examine the methodological consequences of utilizing 
more domain specific vs. generalized awareness variables, as well as more active vs. 
dispositional awareness operationalizations when operationalizing awareness, both in 
terms of enhanced internal and external validity.  
The findings in the current work (Zabel & Olson, 2014) are consistent with a 
MODE Model perspective. Specifically, in the absence of an applicable motive (i.e., 
Concern), automatic attitudes directly predict social judgments. In comparison, when an 
applicable motive is high (i.e., Concern), the influence of automatic attitudes in social 
judgments can be corrected. This tendency was exemplified by high Concern individuals 
in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition, for whom pro-White 
automatically-activated racial attitudes led to increasingly pro-Black trait ratings. Though 
findings are also generally consistent with the Moderated Consistency Model (Hofmann 
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et al., 2005) in that implicit-explicit divergence occurs for those with a high adjustment 
motive (i.e., high Concern motivation), the MODE Model provides a more 
comprehensive account for this and related research. Specifically, relative to the 
Moderated Consistency Model, the MODE Model uniquely posits that implicit-explicit 
consistency depends on the nature of an applicable motive. Only the MODE Model is 
compatible with both the current work and previous research in which motivation leads to 
greater implicit-explicit correspondence (Phillips & Olson, 2014). The current research 
indicates that individuals have accurate access to their automatic racial attitudes under 
some circumstances, but I contend that how this awareness prompts behavior and social 
judgments is dependent on the nature of the activated motive.  
The current findings demonstrate the remarkable flexibility of self-affirmation in 
facilitating approach to otherwise self-threatening information (Harris & Napper, 2005). 
Indeed, self-affirmation within a realm unrelated to the nature of the self-threat was 
sufficient to facilitate more accurate introspection among participants who were self-
affirmed and subsequently introspected. I interpret these findings as self-affirmation 
“opening the gate” to accurate introspection and reducing defensiveness to otherwise 
potentially threatening self-knowledge among highly egalitarian-oriented Whites. Indeed, 
converging evidence indicating the efficacy of self-affirmation in enabling attention to 
otherwise self-threatening information has been demonstrated using a diverse 
experimental procedures and methods, such as dot probe tasks (Klein & Harris, 2009), 
willingness to read self-threatening information (Sherman et al., 2000), and more 
indirectly as in the current work. These findings indicate that self-affirmations are not 
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only sufficient to facilitating acknowledgement of otherwise self-threatening information 
within health domains (Klein & Harris, 2009; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al., 
2000), but also within the realm of prejudice and intergroup relations (see also Adams et 
al., 2006).  
Perhaps most prominently, the current work is consistent with an Aversive 
Racism perspective (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). An egalitarianism self-image and 
automatic prejudice defines aversive racists (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Song Hing et al., 
2008). Aversive racists engage in a variety of strategies to maintain an egalitarian self-
image. Consistent with Aversive Racism Theory, the default tactic of failing to introspect 
on (and subsequently to correct for) one’s racial prejudices among egalitarian-oriented 
individuals is one such strategy. The strategy is akin to classic Aversive Racism research 
in which liberal callers were especially quick to prematurely hang up in a phone call in 
conversation with an apparent Black caller in order to avoid the future prospect of their 
egalitarian self-image being threatened (Gaertner, 1973). Indeed, that accurate 
introspection and correction for automatic prejudice is avoided in the Control condition 
attests to the particularly insidious nature of Aversive Racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986): the very individuals that perceive they are improving intergroup relations may be 
among the least likely of individuals to correct for their prejudices under most 
circumstances. Failing to introspect on their racial prejudices permits egalitarian-oriented 
individuals to maintain a state of “ignorant bliss,” in which their egalitarian self-images 
are actively maintained at the expense of actual correction for automatic prejudice.  
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Self-affirmation appears to reduce the self-threat of introspecting on automatic 
racial prejudices for high egalitarian-oriented Whites, which appears to be essential in 
accurately identifying and subsequently correcting for automatic prejudices. In other 
words, self-affirmations prompted egalitarian-oriented individuals to “let their guard 
down” with regard to maintaining an egalitarian self-image. In such contexts, individuals 
were willing to actually bring to the forefront their otherwise self-threatening automatic 
racial attitudes when asked to introspect. These findings indicate that self-affirmation 
followed by introspection may reduce the tendency for aversive racists to avoid 
potentially self-threatening contexts that often in turn restrict prejudice correction. 
Indeed, self-affirmation and racial attitude introspection may curtail aversive racism 
effects by opening egalitarian-oriented Whites up to otherwise self-threatening 
information. Future research should continue to examine these possibilities. It is 
important to note that self-affirmation alone did not push individuals toward correcting 
for their automatic prejudices. If this had been the case, Self-Affirmation Only 
participants would also have corrected for their automatic prejudices in trait judgments, 
which they clearly did not. Thus, reducing the threat of accepting information potentially 
detrimental to one’s egalitarian self-image is only half the battle; interventions aimed at 
facilitating sufficient prejudice correction must also facilitate active introspection.  
Convergent validity in support of the Aversive Racism tenets as theoretical 
underpinnings for the current findings would perhaps be most substantiated if prejudice 
correction effects were demonstrated toward the symbolic racism (Henry et al., 2002) 
explicit attitude measure among egalitarian-oriented Whites. Symbolic racism is akin to 
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Aversive Racism in that one’s own prejudices are purported to be due to the result of 
value violations between one’s group and another group, rather than direct hostility or a 
lack of egalitarianism. Indeed, just as Aversive Racism allows for maintenance of 
egalitarian ideals while simultaneously failing to correct for prejudices, so too does 
symbolic racism.  
I conducted supplemental analyses with Symbolic Racism entered as the 
dependent variable to test for the expected automatic prejudice correction tendency 
among High Concern individuals with pro-White automatically-activated attitudes in the 
Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition. A hierarchical regression 
uncovered the expected Predictor (Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second vs. Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second) x Concern x Automatically-Activated Racial 
Attitudes interaction, t (191) = 3.13, p < .01, such that among participants with pro-White 
automatically-activated attitudes (+1 SD) in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
Second condition, Concern was expectedly negatively predictive of symbolic racism, t 
(41) = -2.87, p < .01. In the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition among 
individuals with pro-Black automatically-activated attitudes (-1 SD), Concern was not 
predictive of symbolic racism, t (41) = -.20, p = .84. Indeed, this finding, along with the 
automatic prejudice correction pattern among high Concern individuals in the Self-
Affirmation First/Introspection Second condition regarding the prejudice composite 
measure and pro-Black trait ratings is congruent with an Aversive Racism perspective.  
These results indicate that intergroup interaction should encourage not only 
egalitarianism (Rabinowitz, Wittig, Von Braun, Franke, & Zander-Music, 2005), but also 
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both opportunities for self-affirmations followed by  honest and open personal reflection 
about one’s own racial biases in order to more readily facilitate automatic prejudice 
correction. The complexities of interracial interactions, including the preferred 
conversational strategies (Johnson, Olson, & Fazio, 2009), expectations (Shelton, 
Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005), motives (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010), and 
other psychological “baggage” that partners bring to such interactions may further 
complicate the degree to which self-affirmations and personal introspection of racial 
biases can be readily incorporated. However, given the importance of prejudice 
correction for intergroup interactions and lower status group member outcomes 
specifically, examining whether self-affirmation and racial attitude introspection 
elements can be successfully incorporated within interracial interactions, as well as 
prejudice reduction techniques more generally (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, 
& Rust, 1993; Pettigrew, 1998) is warranted in future research.  
  In sum, the findings reported here indicate that egalitarian-oriented Whites fail to 
correct for their prejudices not because they lack introspective access to their racial 
biases, but rather because they evade introspection in order to avoid a potential threat to 
their egalitarian self-image. However, self-affirmation appears to reduce the self-threat of 
racial attitude introspection among egalitarian-oriented Whites, prompting individuals 
who subsequently introspected to correct for their automatic prejudices in the 
hypothesized manner. These results are congruent with ample research implicating the 
importance of self-affirmations in promoting attention the otherwise self-threatening 
information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Klein & Harris, 2009).  
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Furthermore, findings are consistent with MODE Model (Fazio, 1990) and 
Aversive Racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) theoretical perspectives. These findings 
have implications for Aversive Racism Theory. Specifically, egalitarian-oriented 
individuals have been demonstrated to express their prejudices when social norms are 
vague, as well as to engage in strategies to avoid future situations that may threaten their 
egalitarian self-image in previous research (Gaertner, 1973; see Pearson et al., 2009, for a 
review). These strategies often result in a failure to correct for prejudices, leading to 
negative consequences for lower status group members. The findings here indicate that 
self-affirmation followed by racial attitude introspection may be the specific ingredients 
that offer a solution to the fundamental problem of aversive racism and its negative 
consequences. Future research should examine whether self-affirmation and racial 
attitude introspection lead aversive racists to correct for prejudice even in contexts when 
social norms are ambiguous, as well as reduce the employment of avoidance strategies 
used in the service of protecting one’s egalitarian self-image. Indeed, the results here are 
promising, and suggest that the insidious nature of and consequences stemming from 
aversive racism may begin to be squelched in contexts that promote self-affirmation and 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For All Participants (Averaging Across Condition) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation .00 .95   ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation -.03 .98 .05    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
.000003 .00012 -.10 -.11   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.25 .31 .07 .00 -.03   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.09 .35 .11 .07 -.04 .84**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.45 .37 .07 -.03 -.07 .85** .44**  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  .000 .83 -.36** -.02 .09 -.31** -.23** -.39**   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.39 .58 -.32** -.09 .13* -.29** -.26** -.31** .89**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 2.03 .54 -.25** -.01 .03 -.31** -.19** -.40** .82** .65**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.34 .48 -.35** -.02 .06 -.21** -.12* -.30** .85** .70** .62**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.81 .74 -.28** .05 .08 -.23* -.19** -.26** .76** .60** .43** .48**   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 4.18 .69 .35** .03 -.03 .07 .04 .15** -.41** -.39** -.36** -.52** -.08   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.33** -.13* .05 .01 -.00 -.02 .16** .17** .09 .19** .05 -.04 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 
a Higher scores indicate more automatically prejudiced attitude; b = Female = 0; Male = 1 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For Control Condition Participants 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation -.25 1.00    ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation .18 1.19 .21    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
.000004 .00013 -.10 -.27*   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.26 .39 .26* -.17 -.06   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.07 .46 .24 -.16 .01 .90**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.45 .42 .22 -.13 -.12 .88** .59**  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  -.02 .85 -.46** .04 .02 -.66** -.65** -.51**   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.36 .59 -.45** .04 .06 -.63** -.69** -.42** .91**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 2.05 .53 -.36** .06 -.14 -.55** -.46** -.52** .79** .64**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.34 .51 -.38** -.04 .03 -.49** -.50** -.36** .85** .71** .67**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.78 .80 -.34** .06 .10 -.50** -.50** -.39** .74** .65** .33** .44**   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 4.22 .69 .46** -.10 -.10 .45** .46** .33** -.58** -.54** -.53** -.65** -.21   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.43** -.18 .03 .05 .08 .02 .32** .32** .28* .35** .11 -.13 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For Introspection Only Condition Participants  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation -.06 .81    ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation -.08 .89 .34**    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
-.00004 .00013 .01 -.13   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.13 .25 -.20 -.05 -.09   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.06 .28 -.06 .10 -.12 .82**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.32 .35 -.04 -.04 -.09 .81** .21  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  -.09 .78 -.47** -.23 -.11 -.18 -.09 -.63**   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.38 .55 -.47** -.37** -.06 -.17 -.16 -.54** .91**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 1.91 .47 -.33** -.32** .05 -.26* -.08 -.67** .78** .67**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.36 .47 -.42** .15 -.12 -.01 .05 -.35 .88** .80** .56**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.69 .71 -.35** .03 -.21 -.19 -.10 -.45** .76** .55** .40** .55**   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 3.98 .78 .45** .35** .06 -.31** -.20 .05 -.43** -.46** -.26* -.52** -.17   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.23** -.06 .05 .06 .10 -.26 .34** .32** .29* .40** .13 -.16 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 
a Higher scores indicate more automatically prejudiced attitude; b = Female = 0; Male = 1
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For Self-Affirmation Only Condition Participants  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation .22 1.03    ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation -.12 .97 -.16    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
.000006 .00012 -.07 -.05   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.26 .28 -.03 .01 .07   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.08 .31 .11 .10 .05 .78**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.45 .38 -.13 -.07 .06 .86** .36**  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  .05 .93 -.46** .08 -.02 -.28* -.19 -.27*   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.47 .67 -.29* -.04 -.10 -.31** -.21 -.29* .86**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 2.10 .60 -.36** .04 .10 -.31** -.20 -.30** .89** .71**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.31 .52 -.49** .16 .04 -.07 .02 -.11 .84** .63** .66**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.80 .74 -.42** .12 -.13 -.27* -.26* -.20 .80** .55** .62** .55**   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 4.25 .69 .53** -.24 -.19 -.18 -.11 -.19 -.41** -.38** -.37** -.48** -.13   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.05 -.05 .06 .14 .16 .08 -.15 -.09 .18 .00 -.25* -.01 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 




Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For Introspection First/Self-Affirmation Second Condition 
Participants 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation .20 .77    ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation -.14 .93 -.08    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
.000013 .00010 -.10 -.16   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.32 .32 -.05 .32* -.12   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.12 .42 -.06 .44** -.14 .89**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.51 .33 -.02 .05 -.07 .81** .44**  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  .02 .69 -.07 -.07 .31* .01 .20 -.24   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.37 .48 -.16 -.13 .36** .09 .19 -.07 .89**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 2.06 .50 -.09 -.02 .28* -.14 .04 -.33** .78** .61**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.29 .44 -.00 -.10 .14 -.06 .14 -.30* .79** .64** .64**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.93 .73 .02 .04 .17 .13 .22 -.02 .60** .50** .14 .15   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 4.24 .68 .05 .15 -.03 -.03 -.17 .15 -.26 -.18 -.41** -.59** .36**   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.24 -.35** .15 -.13 -.16 -.04 .38** .50** .25 .14 .27* .04 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 
a Higher scores indicate more automatically prejudiced attitude; b = Female = 0; Male = 1 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables For Self-Affirmation First/Introspection Second Condition 
Participants 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 M SD 1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. Concern Motivation -.09 1.04    ---            
               
2. Restraint Motivation .02 .88 .07    ---           
               
3. Automatic Racial 
Attitudesa 
.000034 .00013 -.22 .03   ---          
               
4. Pro-Black Trait 
Ratings 
.27 .26 .18 .04 -.16   ---         
               
5. Pro-Black Individual 
Ratings 
.10 .27 .18 .01 -.08 .81**   ---        
               
6. Pro-Black Group 
Ratings 
.45 .33 .13 .04 -.18 .88** .43**  ---       
               
7.Prejudice Composite  .04 .87 -.31** .03 .28* -.37** -.24 -.37**   ---      
               
8. Subtle Prejudice 2.36 .58 -.30** .00 .30** -.27* -.25 -.21 .90**   ---     
               
9. Blatant Racism 2.04 .56 -.16 .11 .05 -.35** -.20 -.37** .80** .59**   ---    
               
10. Symbolic Racism 2.37 .50 -.34** -.02 .24 -.32** -.13 -.38** .88** .74** .60**   ---   
               
11. Anti-Black 
Attitudes 
3.88 .73 -.29* .00 .38** -.32** -.24 -.30** .86** .77** .53** .66**   ---  
               
12. Pro-Black Attitudes 4.23 .58 .19 .00 -.05 .17 .04 .23 -.42** -.39** -.37** -.41** -.27*   --- 
               
13. Genderb   ---   --- -.63** -.08 -.04 -.11 -.21 -.00 .03 .01 -.04 .07 .06 .09 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** Correlations are significant at p < .05; * Correlations are significant at p <.10 
a Higher scores indicate more automatically prejudiced attitude; b = Female = 0; Male  = 1
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Figure 1. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
predicting overall pro-Black trait ratings in the Self-Affirmation First/Introspection 
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Figure 2. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
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Figure 3. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
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Figure 4. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
predicting mean overall critical target trait rating response latencies in the Self-
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Figure 5. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
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Figure 6. Concern Motivation x Automatically-Activated Racial Attitudes interaction in 
predicting overall mean critical target trait rating response latencies in the Self-
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